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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to the Utah Supreme Court's Order dated February 22, 1989, and
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988)•

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This suit was brought by Home Savings to recover its
losses on second mortgage loans which it made to AFCO investors
from November 1981 to January 1982. Those loans involved Grant
Affleck's infamous scheme to have people take out second
mortgages on their homes and to sign over the proceeds to
AFCO.

Home Savings' management directly negotiated with Grant

Affleck to participate as a lender in the AFCO scheme, and
Home's management consciously changed lending practices and
procedures to accommodate Affleck's operation.

Nearly seven

months after the last AFCO investor loan was made, and several
months after the loans had all gone into default and the AFCO
investors had sued Home Savings, Home Savings bought a Savings
& Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form 22, from The Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company.

Home Savings now claims in this action

that its losses were caused by the dishonest acts of one minor
employee, a loan solicitor named Larry Glad, and that the
losses are covered by the fidelity bond issued by Aetna on
July 14, 1982.
The trial court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy
presiding, made several dispositive rulings before trial which

reduced the number of issues to be considered by the jury.

The

remaining issues were then tried to a jury over a period of
four and one-half weeks in the fall of 1987.

Prior to

submitting the case to the jury, the trial court made several
additional legal rulings further limiting Aetna's defenses that
the jury could consider.

Ultimately, the jury completed a

Special Verdict form making some findings in plaintiff's
favor.

It also answered Special Interrogatories in defendant's

favor on several dispositive defenses.

The court disregarded

the Special Interrogatory findings, and entered Judgment for
plaintiff.
Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company appeals
from the following rulings of the trial court: the final
judgment entered on November 2, 1988, the Minute Entry dated
May 29, 1987, the Order dated June 5, 1987, the Minute Order
dated August 19, 1987, the Minute Order dated August 20, 1987,
the Order and Minute Entry dated August 25, 1987, the Order
dated September 21, 1987, the court's oral ruling on the record
denying defendant's Rule 50(a) Motion dated November 10, 1987,
the Order dated December 21, 1987 denying defendant's Rule
50(b) Motion, the Memorandum Decision dated March 4, 1988, and
the Minute Entry dated May 10, 1988.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Issues Requiring Reversal:
1.

The jury found that Home Savings learned of

its employee's (Larry Glad's) dishonesty in December 1981
during his employment, before many of the loans were closed,
and seven months before the Bond was even issued.

Does Section

11 of the Bond, which terminates coverage for an employee as
soon as the Savings and Loan learns of such dishonesty,
preclude coverage for loss from Larry Glad's conduct?
2.

Home Savings was sued several times on the

AFCO investor loans, and the loans were all in default, all
several months before the Bond was even issued.

Did the trial

court err by concluding as a matter of law that Home
Savings' discovery of loss occurred after Aetna issued the Bond?
3.

The jury concluded on Special Interrogatories

Nos. 2 and 4 that Home Savings made misrepresentations and
nondisclosures in applying for the Aetna Bond.

Did the trial

court err in disregarding those findings and in entering
judgment against Aetna notwithstanding the jury's responses?

B. Issues Requiring Remand for Further Proceedings;
4.

In 1986, the Federal District Court for Utah

found Home Savings liable for primary and secondary violations
of state and federal securities laws in connection with its

-3-

loans to AFCO investors.

Did this trial court err in failing

to exclude the losses on the AFCO loans from bond coverage by
virtue of the Bond's trading exclusion rider?
5.

Two of Aetna's key trial defenses were that

Home Savings exercised bad business judgment in entering into
the arrangement with Grant Affleck and that Home Savings
subsequently mismanaged the AFCO investor loans by failing to
follow safe, sound lending procedures and its own policies.
Did the trial court err by precluding the jury's consideration
of these defenses as a cause of Home Savings' losses and by
failing to allow the jury to make an allocation of causation
between bad business judgment and mismanagement, on the one
hand, and the conduct of Larry Glad, on the other?
6.

Did the trial court err by failing to require

plaintiff to join as an indispensable party its prior fidelity
insurer, Fidelity and Deposit of Maryland, which covered Home
Savings under an identical Savings & Loan Blanket Bond,
Standard Form 22, which was in place during the relevant events
in 1981 and up until June 21, 1982?

C. Issues Requiring Reduction of Damages:
7.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the

amount of Home Savings' losses should not be offset by the
amount of money Home Savings recouped directly from the AFCO
investor loan proceeds?
8.

The Bond only indemnifies the insured for

defense costs related to claims which, if proven, would

-4-

constitute covered losses.

Did the trial court err in awarding

as part of the damages in this case the plaintiffs1 attorneys1
fees in the suit filed by the AFCO investors against Home
Savings and the full amount of attorney's fees and costs
incurred by Home Savings in defending state and federal
securities laws claims and the truth-in-lending claims in that
lawsuit?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Under Point III, the Appellate Court's application of
U.C.A. § 31-19-8(1) (1974) pertaining to applications for
insurance would be dispositive of the entire case if this Court
upholds the jury's determination that Home Savings acquired the
Aetna Bond through material misrepresentations or omissions,
and that Aetna would not have issued the Bond if it had known
of the misrepresented or omitted facts.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Action.
The central dispute in this lawsuit involves a

Savings and Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form 22.

The Bond

provides coverage for losses resulting from employee dishonesty
sustained at any time but "discovered" during the Bond
period.

The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ("Aetna")

issued the Bond to Home Savings and Loan Association ("Home
Savings") effective beginning June 21, 1982. In 1986 in the
case of Armitage v. Home Savings, a predecessor action, the
Federal District Court for Utah entered judgment pursuant to
jury verdicts against Home Savings for $1.4 million as a result
of Home Savings1 state and federal securities law violations,
coitimon law fraud, and truth-in-lending violations, all of which
Home committed from November 1981 to January 1982. Home
Savings knew of the facts that ultimately gave rise to the loss
from information it obtained from December 1981 to June 4,
1982.

In addition, numerous lawsuits were filed against Home

Savings by AFCO investors in March, April, and May 1982, before
the Bond was issued.

Nevertheless, Home Savings then filed

this action to obtain indemnification from Aetna against the
claims of those AFCO investors which were established in the
Armitage judgment.
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II.

Course of Proceedings, and Trial Court Disposition,
Home Savings1 Amended Complaint alleged that it

suffered losses on second mortgage loans to AFCO investors
because of the dishonesty of one of its employees, Larry Glad.
Aetna answered that if Larry Glad's dishonesty were the
effective cause of the Armitage verdict, then Home Savings
had learned of the dishonesty and had discovered its loss prior
to the period of Aetna's Bond.

Section 11 of the Bond provides

for termination of coverage as to any employee as soon as an
employer learns of that employee's dishonesty.

The Bond also

provides that "discovery of loss" occurs when the insured
actually learns of a loss or of facts that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that a loss might result or when
it is put on notice by a third party of a claim which would
constitute a covered loss.
In the alternative, Aetna argued that Home's employee
had not been "dishonest," as specifically defined by the Bond,
because he lacked "manifest intent to cause [Home Savings] to
sustain" a loss on the AFCO investor loans.

In addition, Aetna

argued both that the Bond specifically excluded coverage for
losses from trading in the AFCO securities, and that the losses
in Armitage were caused by the bad business judgment and
mismanagement of Home Savings' officers and directors, rather
than the conduct of one minor employee.
A series of pretrial, trial and post-trial motions
were made by both parties.

The trial court ruled against Aetna
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on every significant issue.

Most notably, before trial the

court ruled as a matter of law that because Home Savings did
not "sustain" a loss until February 1986 when the Armitage
judgment was entered, that it could not have "discovered" its
loss prior to that time, despite the Bond's reasonable person
and per se standards of discovery, and in spite of
considerable evidence that Home Savings actually learned of an
impending loss before buying the Aetna Bond.
A four and one-half week jury trial of this case was
conducted in October and November, 1987 before the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, Third Judicial District Court.

Before

submitting the case to the jury, the trial court determined
that it would not allow Aetna to refuse coverage under
Section 11 of the Bond even though Home Savings learned of
Larry Glad's dishonesty many months before purchasing the Aetna
Bond.

In addition, and in spite of substantial evidence

presented by Aetna, the court refused to allow the jury to
consider Aetna's primary factual defense that Home Savings'
loss was caused not by employee dishonesty, but by the
mismanagement and the bad business judgment of its officers and
directors.

Finally, although the jury made dispositive

findings in Aetna's favor in response to certain Special
Interrogatories, the trial court entered judgment against Aetna
on November 2, 1988 in the amount of $1,977,505.73, plus court
costs of $3,751.75, and prejudgment interest in the amount of
$2,915.08.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

Home Savings' Loans Made to AFCO Investors.
1.

From mid-November, 1981 through the first

week of January, 1982, Home Savings made a total of 42 second
mortgage loans to individuals ("AFCO investors") who
invested the proceeds in several interrelated companies
("AFCO") owned and/or controlled by Grant C. Affleck. The
loans were secured by second trust deeds on the investors'
homes.

(See Stipulated Pretrial Order, Uncontroverted Facts,

R. at 727; and Jury Instruction No. 15, R. at 1313.)

(Copies

of the Stipulated Pretrial Order and of selected Jury
Instructions are included at Document Addenda A and B,
respectively, to Aetna's Appellant's Brief.)

B.

Home Savings Learns of Employee Dishonesty and Discovers
Losses on the AFCO Investor Loans.
2.

Throughout the three months of AFCO investor

lending activity in 1981, and during the first half of 1982,
before Home Savings purchased the Bond from Aetna on July 14,
1982, Home Savings' officers and directors learned of a number
of significant facts about the conduct of its employee, Larry
Glad, about Grant Affleck and his AFCO businesses, and about
irregularities and pending losses on the AFCO investor loans.
Those facts and when Home Savings learned of them, are as
follows:
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a.

Prior to granting a $100,000 loan to AFCO

Enterprises on November 10, 1981, Home Savings had in
its possession a credit report on AFCO Enterprises
which showed a foreclosure proceeding against AFCO by
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan, an unsatisfactory
record on AFCO's business checking account, slow
payment by AFCO to its creditors, and unverifiable
assets and income.

(Tr. Ex. 13; F. Smolka testimony

[test.] at 2919.19, .163-.167.)
b.

Home Savings learned in approximately

mid-December 1981 that Larry Glad had engaged in
dishonest and fraudulent acts unrelated to the AFCO
investor loans.

(Jury Special Interrogatories Nos. 5

through 8, R. at 1353-54.)

(Copies of the Jury

Special Verdict and Jury Special Interrogatories are
included as Document Addenda C and D, respectively,
of Aetna's Appellant's Brief.)
c.

On December 20, 1981, Home Savings learned

that in November 1981 Larry Glad had received $15,000
directly from AFCO for his handling of the investor
loans.

(Pretrial Order, Stipulated Facts, R. at 6;

Jury Instruction No. 15, R. at 1313; W. Cox test., R.
at 2905.83-.85.)

As a result, Home Savings fired

Larry Glad on December 29, 1981.
Smolka test.
d.

(R. at 154.2; F.

R. at 2919.37.)

On or about February 26, 1982, Fred Smolka

received a letter from Grant Affleck advising Home
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Savings of two major irregularities in the investor
loans: (i) back-dating of documents affecting the
borrower's right of rescission under federal
truth-in-lending laws; and (ii) closing of loans
outside of Home Savings' offices and without the
required presence of Home Savings' representative.
(Trial Exhibit [Tr. Ex.] 20; H. Bradshaw test., R. at
2907.110-.112; F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.50-.52.)
(A copy of Affleck's letter is included at Tab 20 of
Aetna's Exhibit Addendum.)

Affleck's February 26,

1982 letter also came to the personal attention of
Home Savings' President, Howard Bradshaw.

(H.

Bradshaw test., R. at 2907.110-.112.)
e.

In January 1982, contrary to its policy only

to accept payment on a loan from the individual
borrower, Home Savings accepted a $10,549.85 check
from AFCO to be applied on the first monthly payment
due on the investor loans.

The check was not honored

because of AFCO's insufficient funds.

(Tr. Ex. 81;

Fred Smolka test., R. at 2919.47-.49.)

(A copy of

the check is included at Tab 18 of Aetna's Exhibit
Addendum.)
f.

By February 28, 1982, the AFCO investor loans

began showing delinquencies.

(F. Smolka test., R. at

2919.55.)
g.

On March 8, 1982, the AFCO companies filed

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions in the United States
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Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Utah.
(See Pretrial Order, Incontroverted Facts; R. at 724;
R. at 2962-2967.)
h.

Between the AFCO bankruptcy filing and the

date of the Bond (June 21, 1982), Salt Lake's two
major newspapers reported on the AFCO bankruptcy and
the financial collapse of Grant Affleck's real estate
empire no fewer than 31 times.

(R. at pp. 2969-95.)

Fred Smolka, then Executive Vice President of Home
Savings, was aware of and familiar with the local
newspaper reports about AFCO's precarious financial
circumstances.

(F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.54,

2920.33.)
i.

At Home Savings' March 17, 1982 Board of

Directors Meeting, "Wallace Woodbury, Legal Counsel,
reported the status of second mortgage loans referred
by AFCO in light of AFCO's bankruptcy.

Counsel

report[ed] that Home's position should be sound based
on documentation of the loans."

(Tr. Ex. Ill; a copy

of Minutes of Home Savings' Board of Directors is
included at Tab 111 of Exhibit Addendum.)
j.

On April 7, 1982, Howard Bradshaw, then

President of Home Savings, communicated with First
Federal Savings & Loan in Great Falls, Montana (one
of the purchasers of Home Savings' private placement
of second mortgage AFCO investor loans), regarding
AFCO's "extreme cash flow problem," AFCO's "obvious
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inability to live up to [its] promise," and the
impact which those difficulties were having upon Home
Savings1 collection of monthly payments from AFCO
investors.

(R. at 3005; Tr. Ex. 53, included at

Tab 53 of Exhibit Addendum.)

By April 1982, the AFCO

investor loans were in default and Home Savings had
sent demands or instituted foreclosure actions to
enforce the loans against the investors.

(H.

Bradshaw test., R. at 2907.122-.123; 2907.138-.139.)
k.

In March and April, 1982, still months before

the purchase of the Aetna Bond, three separate
lawsuits were filed by AFCO investors and served on
Home Savings (Pretrial Order, Uncontested Facts,
para. 11, R. at 725), alleging fraud, lending
irregularities, and securities violations.
356, 357, 358, 359, and 360.)

(Tr. Exs.

After various pretrial

maneuverings and proceedings, the largest of those
cases became the Armitage v. Home Savings case in
which judgment was entered against Home Savings.
1.

In March and April 1982, Home Savings

received at least three letters from attorneys for
AFCO investors.

The letters notified Home Savings of

numerous, serious irregularities in the processing
and closing of the AFCO investor loans.

(F. Smolka

test., R. at 2920.39-.40; Tr. Exs. 113, 114, and
115.)

Those letters set forth the exact
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irregularities which later formed the basis of the
judgment in Armitage.
m.

(Id*)

On June 4, 1982, approximately six weeks

before Home Savings purchased the Bond from Aetna,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), the
federal agency which supervised Home Savings,
completed its report of an annual examination of Home
Savings and submitted a Report of Examination,

(Tr.

Ex. 196; a copy of the FHLBB Examination Report is
included at Tab 196 of the Exhibit Addendum.)

Home

Savings had immediate access to that Report.
n.

The FHLBB found multiple irregularities in

Home Savings' lending practices, specifically citing
the AFCO investor loans. The FHLBB also reported loan
defaults, lawsuits and indications of lending
irregularities from Home Savings1 own files.

The

FHLBB concluded that Home Savings1 management had
subjected Home Savings to possible losses on the AFCO
investor loans, noting that Home Savings had already
scheduled $888,998 on 41 investor loans as delinquent
with risk of potential loss, and it had established a
bad debt reserve on these loans.

(Tr. Ex. 196;

Elaine Weis test., R. at 2909.111-.114.)
C.

Existing Bond During the Loan Closings and Discovery of
Loss.
3.

Throughout the period from November 1981

through June 21, 1982, Home Savings had $900,000 of fidelity
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bond coverage under a Standard Form 22 which was identical to
Aetna's Bond, but which had been issued by Fidelity and Deposit
Company of Maryland ("F&D").
test., R. at 2906.24-.26.)

(Depo. Ex. 116; D. Bradshaw
(A copy of F&D's bond is included

at Tab 116 of Aetna's Exhibit Addendum.)

Like Aetna's Bond,

F&D's bond was a discovery-type policy which covered "loss
sustained at any time but discovered during the Bond period.

D.

Aetna's New Fidelity Bond.
4.

In applying for the Aetna Bond, Home Savings

did not disclose any of its knowledge or any information about
suits alleging irregularities in and problems with the AFCO
investor loans.

(Tr. Ex. 122.)

5.

On July 14, 1982, Aetna issued to Home

Savings $1,135,000 of coverage under a Savings and Loan Blanket
Bond, Standard Form 22 (the "Bond").

(Exhibit A to Home

Savings' Amended Complaint; Tr. Ex. 343 included at Tab 343 of
Exhibit Addendum.)

Aetna's Bond was made retroactively

effective to June 21, 1982, the date F&D's prior coverage was
due to expire.

E.

Terms and Coverage Under the Bond.
6.

The Bond contained basic employee fidelity

coverage, which provided that Aetna would "indemnify and
hold harmless" Home Savings for "loss resulting directly from
one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee,

-15-

committed anywhere and whether committed alone or in collusion
with others . . . ."
7.

(Insuring Agreement (A), Tr. Ex. 343.)

The Bond did not cover losses resulting from

the voluntary or intentional decisions or acts of Home Savings1
officers and directors in the course of its business.

Losses

sustained as a result of mismanagement and bad business
judgment were not covered.
8.

As stated in the preamble to the Bond, it

provided coverage only "with respect to loss sustained by the
insured at any time but discovered during the Bond
Period. . . . "

(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 3)
9.

(emphasis added.)

In the "Conditions and Limitations" portion

of the Bond, Section 11 specifically terminated coverage for an
employee such as Larry Glad "as soon as the Insured shall learn
of any dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of such
Employee . . . ."

(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 5.)

was contained in the F&D bond.
10.

This same limitation

(Depo. Ex. 116, p. 5.)

A Rider to the Bond on form SR 6091 provides

that the insured's "discovery" of loss occurs objectively when
the insured learned of "facts which would cause a reasonable
person to assume a loss . . . has been or will be incurred."
(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 25.)

Rider 6091 also established per se

discovery of loss when the insured received "notice . . . of an
actual or potential claim by a third party . . . which, if
true, would create a loss under the bond."
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Id.

11.

Another Rider on form SR 6030a excludes from

coverage any loss resulting directly or indirectly from trading
in securities.
12.

(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 22.)
The General Agreements section of the Bond

obligates Aetna to indemnify Home Savings only for Court Costs
and Attorney's Fees "incurred and paid by the Insured in
defending any suit or legal proceeding —

which, if established

against the Insured, would constitute a valid and collectible
loss . . . under the terms of this bond."
p. 3.)

(Tr. Ex. 343,

Costs for defending any claim (i.e., securities law

violations) outside the coverage of the Bond are not
reimbursable.

F.

Subsequent Developments After Aetna's Bond was Issued.
13.

On December 9 and 21, 1982, Home Savings

finally notified Aetna and F&D of the possibility of a loss
covered by the Bond from the pending cases, including Armitage
v. Home Savings.

(Tr. Exs. 119 and 120; copies of notices to

Aetna included at Tabs 119 and 120 of Exhibit Addendum.)
14.

On September 30, 1983, Aetna elected not to

assume defense of the Armitage litigation because the claim
fell outside the coverage of the bond.

(Tr. Ex. 140.)

F&D

also issued a denial of coverage for independent reasons.
15.

On August 14, 1984, the Armitage jury

rendered Special Verdicts against Home Savings, finding it
liable in each of 36 AFCO investor loans for three primary
violations of state and federal securities fraud provisions.
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(A copy of the Armitage Special Verdict is included at
Document Addendum E, R. at 210.70-.76.)

In addition, the jury

found Home Savings secondarily liable on the 3 6 AFCO investor
loans both for controlling and for aiding and abetting
violations by Grant Affleck and/or AFCO of § 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.

Id.

The Armitage jury also found Home Savings

liable for common law fraud, and for violations of federal
Truth-in-Lending regulations.
16.

Id.

A Final Judgment in the Armitage case was

entered on February 24, 1986.

(Exhibit B to Home Savings1

Amended Complaint; Tr. Ex. 33 0.)

(A copy of the Armitage

judgment is included at Tab 330 of Aetna's Exhibit Addendum.)
The Armitage judgment rescinded the AFCO investor promissory
notes and trust deeds resulting in a net principal loss to Home
Savings of $998,623 and included $10,000 of punitive damages.
17.

The Armitage court also entered a Judgment

for Attorney's Fees against Home Savings on August 24, 1986, in
the amount of $381,294.

The Judgment for Attorneys Fees was

later negotiated down to $190,647.

(See Pretrial Order,

Uncontroverted Facts, paras. 22-24; Document Addendum A; R. at
727-28.)

G.

The Present Lawsuit.
18.

Home Savings filed its Amended Complaint in

the present action against Aetna on April 21, 1986.
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(R. at

13-24.)

In filing the action, Home claimed that the losses it

suffered in the Armitage case were wholly caused by the
dishonest acts of its employee Larry Glad, and that those
losses are covered by the employee fidelity bond issued by
Aetna.

Although Home Savings1 key officers directly negotiated

with Grant Affleck and entered into agreements with him
regarding the AFCO investor loans; although Home Savings1 Board
of Directors specifically approved participation in the AFCO
second mortgages; and although Home Savings' officers
consciously approved, initiated, or allowed extraordinary
lending procedures with regard to the AFCO investor loans:
Home Savings alleged that its loan solicitor, Larry Glad,
caused the Armitage verdict to be entered against it.
(Amended Complaint, para. 15, R. at 20; Pretrial Order,
Plaintiff's Claims, R. at 720-21.)
19.

The alleged misconduct of Larry Glad falls

into three distinct categories:
a. The receipt by Larry Glad in November
1981 of a $15,000 kickback from AFCO;
b. The alleged withholding by Larry Glad of
his personal knowledge about AFCO's
precarious financial circumstances; and
c. Larry Glad's participation in and
purported control of irregularities in the
processing and closing of loans made to AFCO
investors.
(Amended Complaint, para. 9, R. at 16-19.)
20.

As shown in paragraph 2, above, Home Savings

clearly learned of Glad's kickback, of the financial
instability of AFCO, and of egregious irregularities in the
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AFCO investor loans many months before it applied for and was
issued the Aetna Bond.
21.

At trial, the jury found that Home Savings

learned of Larry Glad's dishonesty or fraud fully seven months
before the Aetna Bond was purchased.

(Special Interrogatory

No. 8, R. at 1354; copy at Document Addendum D.)

Furthermore,

Larry Glad was fired by Home Savings within approximately one
week of such discovery.
22.

(F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.37.)

In addition, the jury found that Home Savings

made misrepresentations and nondisclosures of material facts to
Aetna, and also failed to volunteer material information, which
if disclosed would have resulted in Aetna's refusing to issue
the Bond or excluding that risk from coverage.

(Special

Interrogatories 2 and 4, R. at 1353-1353; see Aetna's Document
Addendum D.)

Additional facts pertinent to the separate issues
involved in this appeal, particularly details of Home Savings1
bad business judgment and mismanagement, are contained below in
the specific sections discussing each of those issues.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Given the compelling facts of this case, it would be
both inequitable and contrary to any reasonable
interpretation of the Bond, to require Aetna to indemnify Home
Savings for its loss.

This appeal involves primarily issues of

coverage definitions and matters relating to the timing in Home
Savings1 acquisition of the Bond.

POINT I. SECTION
FROM LARRY GLAD'S
DISHONESTY DURING
CLOSED, AND SEVEN

11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE FOR LOSS
CONDUCT BECAUSE HOME SAVINGS LEARNED OF HIS
HIS EMPLOYMENT, BEFORE MANY OF THE LOANS
MONTHS BEFORE THE BOND WAS PURCHASED.

Section 11 of the bond provides for coverage to be
automatically terminated as to any specific employee as soon as
the insured learns of any dishonest or fraudulent act on
his part.

The trial court ruled as a matter of law that

Section 11 could not apply because it would make coverage for
loss from Glad's conduct void at the inception of the bond
period.

However, to preserve factual findings on this point

for appeal, the jury answered special interrogatories, finding
that Home Savings learned of dishonest or fraudulent acts on
Larry Glad's part prior to his termination from employment at
Home Savings; that the dishonesty did not relate directly to
the AFCO investor loans; and that such knowledge was acquired
in approximately mid-December, 1981, seven months before the
Aetna Bond was issued.

Based upon the jury's answers, Aetna

prevailed on the Section 11 issue.
reversed.
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The judgment should be

POINT II. HOME SAVINGS IS NOT COVERED UNDER AETNA'S FIDELITY
BOND FOR ANY LOSS CAUSED BY LARRY GLAD BECAUSE PLAINTIFF
DISCOVERED ITS LOSS PRIOR TO THE PERIOD OF THE BOND.
The Bond is a "discovery" type bond.

A claim is

covered only if, during the period of the bond, the insured
employer learns of the likelihood of loss from an employee's
infidelity.

Discovery can occur objectively, when the

insured itself learns of facts which would cause a reasonable
person to assume a loss has or will occur; or discovery can
be per se, when the employer receives notice from third
parties of actual or potential claims which would be covered
by the Bond.

Under both the objective and per se standards

of discovery, Home Savings "discovered" its loss between
December 1981 and no later than the FHLBB Examination Report on
June 4, 1982, before it purchased the Bond from Aetna.
The trial court's use of the date of the Armitage
judgment as the date of Home Savings' "discovery of a loss
sustained" as a matter of law, was an incorrect ruling.

The

date a monetary loss actually occurs is irrelevant to the
coverage determination.

Because Home Savings discovered its

loss prior to the Bond's period, there is no coverage for loss
from the AFCO investor loans, and the judgment should be
reversed.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE JURY'S
RESPONSES ON SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 AND ENTERING
A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY'S RESPONSES.
In reaching its verdict, the jury found that Home
Savings made "unintentional misrepresentations or
nondisclosures of facts . . . which materially affected
[Aetna's] risks under the Bond, and that [Aetna] would not have
issued the bond or would have excluded the risk if it had known
these facts."

However, the trial court concluded that there

was insufficient evidence to support those findings, and set
the jury's decision aside.

It was factual error to set aside

the jury's finding after it had heard four and one-half weeks
of evidence and specifically decided these issues in Aetna's
favor.

On the issue of disclosing information not requested on

the application form, the trial court incorrectly held that
there was a legal duty to volunteer information only if there
was an intentional or fraudulent concealment of unrequested
information.

The Bond should be declared void, at least as to

the AFCO investor loan losses which are directly related to
those material misrepresentations and omissions.

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED HOME SAVINGS
TO RECOVER UNDER AETNA'S BOND THOSE LOSSES FROM THE AFCO
INVESTOR LOANS WHICH RESULTED FROM HOME'S VIOLATIONS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS.
Rider 6030a of the Bond specifically excludes
coverage for losses resulting from trading directly or
indirectly in securities.

In the Armitage case, Home Savings

was held liable for three counts of its own primary violations
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of state and federal securities laws, and for two counts of
controlling and of aiding and abetting Grant Affleck in his
violations of securities laws.

The trial court construed

Rider 603 0a right out of the Bond by concluding that what was
decided in Armitage did not constitute "trading" and so the
exclusion didn't apply.

This legal ruling should be reversed,

and the case should be remanded for amendment of the judgment
to exclude losses stemming from Home Savings' securities law
violations.

POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY TO
CONSIDER THE BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT OF HOME
SAVINGS' OFFICERS AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS THE CAUSE OF HOME
SAVINGS' LOSS.
The trial court committed reversible error by:

(1)

refusing to read to the jury a number of key instructions
setting forth Aetna's theory on causation, (2) giving the jury
instructions that inadequately presented Aetna's defense, and
(3) submitting a special verdict to the jury which wholly
failed to mention Home Savings officers' and directors' actions
as being the cause of Home Savings' loss.
The cumulative result of these errors was that the
jury was never allowed to consider Aetna's chief factual
defense of bad business judgment and mismanagement as a
separate, distinct cause of Home Savings' loss.

Although

substantial testimony was introduced on this point, the court
refused to instruct the jury that mismanagement and bad
business judgment could be a cause of loss, distinct from
employee dishonesty; and the jury wasn't allowed to apportion
-24-

the losses between Larry Glad's misconduct and the significant
follies of Home Savings' management.

The case should be

remanded for an apportionment of cause between Larry Glad, on
the one hand, and Home Savings' institutional mismanagement and
bad business judgment, on the other hand.

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR BY FAILING TO
REQUIRE HOME SAVINGS TO JOIN ITS PRIOR FIDELITY BOND INSURER,
F&D OF MARYLAND, AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
Aetna moved early in the case to have the issuer of
Home Savings' prior fidelity bond, Fidelity & Deposit of
Maryland, joined as an indispensable party under Rule 19,
U.R.Civ.P.

This was necessitated both by the interrelated

terms of the two bonds, and by the timing of Home Savings'
discovery of its loss during F&D's policy period.

The trial

court ruled as a matter of law that F&D was not a necessary
party to a full and fair adjudication of the issues between
Aetna and Home Savings, and denied Aetna's motion.

That ruling

was in error because the structure of the two discovery bonds
is intentionally sequential so that fidelity coverage can
continue from policy to policy and insurer to insurer without
either overlap or gaps.

Two of Aetna's key defenses involved

the effect of Home Savings' discovery of its loss and its
knowledge of its employee's dishonesty, both of which occurred
during F&D's bond period.
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POINT VII. PROPER CALCULATION OF HOME SAVINGS' LOSSES
REQUIRES AN OFFSET FOR FUNDS WHICH HOME SAVINGS COLLECTED
DIRECTLY FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE AFCO INVESTOR LOANS.
As Home Savings made loans to the AFCO investors,
some of those loan proceeds were endorsed back to Home
Savings.

Home Savings received $237,760.77 in this manner.

Those funds were used by Home Savings for its own benefit.
Therefore, the principal of Home Savings' total damages should
be reduced by $237,760.77.

POINT VIII. HOME SAVINGS IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION
FOR THE LEGAL FEES AWARDED TO THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS NOR THE
ENTIRE AMOUNT OF COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN
DEFENDING THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION.
Plaintiff's attorneys' fees in the Armitage lawsuit
were awarded against Home Savings as part of the Armitage
verdict, but were ultimately negotiated to $190,647.31.

The

claims giving rise to the award of attorneys' fees were for
violations in the sale or exchange of securities, a risk
specifically excluded under the Trading Rider of the Bond.
Because such losses are excluded from coverage, Aetna had no
obligation to reimburse Home Savings for those fees.

As to

attorneys' fees incurred by Home Savings in defending the
Armitage litigation (the stipulated amount of such fees being
$437,500.00), Aetna had no obligation to defend Home Savings in
the Armitage litigation because Aetna owed no coverage to
Home Savings for losses discovered outside the Bond's period or
losses sustained as a result of trading in securities.
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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION:

APPLICABLE PRECEPTS OF INSURANCE LAW

A number of the issues in this case involve the
interpretation and application of the Bond as a policy of
insurance.

An overview of the law in this area will be helpful

at the outset.
A.

A Bond is a Contract Subject to a Fixed Standard of
Interpretation.
"[T]he bond cannot be extended by implication or

enlarged by construction beyond the actual terms of the
agreement entered into by the parties."

Federal Deposit

Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 426 F.2d 729, 736
(5th Cir. 1970).

"Ambiguity must appear upon the bond or

policy and cannot be read into it by a strained interpretation
in order to permit recovery."

35 Am. Jur. 2d Fidelity Bonds

and Insurance § 3, p. 505 (1988).

The consensus of case law

also provides that "[a] fidelity bond may validly limit the
liability of the insurer on such bond to losses discovered
within a specified term."

13 Couch on Insurance 2d,

§ 46.191 (1982 Ed.).
A provision of a fidelity bond which
clearly limits the liability of the insurer
to losses discovered within a certain
specified period must be enforced according
to its terms, so that there can be no
recovery on a fidelity bond if the loss is
not discovered within the time specified
therein.
Id.

-27-

B.

Policy Riders are an Integral Part of the Contract of
Insurance.
Aetna's Bond has several significant riders attached

to it.

Riders to insurance policies constitute an integral

part of the contract of insurance.
§ 4:27 p. 386 (1984).

1 Couch on Insurance 2d,

This is true even if the rider adds a

new and different meaning to the original contract.

Id. at

386-87.
Standard policy laws sometimes expressly
authorize the attachment of slips or riders
to contracts of insurance in a form
provided thereby, so as to modify the
provisions in the body of the policy; and
where such a rider is properly attached,
pursuant to such provision, it forms a part
of the contract and supersedes the original
provisions to which it applies.
1 Couch on Insurance 2d § 4:29, p. 391 (1984).
The Declarations page of Aetna's Bond at Item 4,
specifically states that "the liability of the underwriter is
subject to the terms" of various riders.

Thus, the terms of

its Riders form an integral part of the Bond.

When rider terms

are specific, as contrasted with general provisions of the
policy, they govern the meaning of the bond.

1 Couch on

Insurance 2d, § 4:28, p. 389-91 (1984).

C.

The Trial Court's Legal Interpretation of an Insurance
Policy is Subject to de Novo Review.
Bonds and insurance policies are contracts, and so

"the trial court's interpretation [is entitled to] no
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presumption of correctness."

Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S.

Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 935 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), citing Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. National Am.
Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988).

Therefore, the

trial court's rulings as a matter of law on the meaning and
application of the Aetna Bond are subject to de novo review
by the appellate court.

Allstate Enterprise, Inc. v.

Heriford, 772 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
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POINT I
SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE
FOR LOSS FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT BECAUSE HOME SAVINGS
LEARNED OF HIS DISHONESTY DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT,
BEFORE MANY OF THE LOANS CLOSED, AND SEVEN
MONTHS BEFORE THE BOND WAS PURCHASED
A.

The Language of Section 11 and its Proper Application.
Section 11 of the Aetna Bond prevented coverage from

ever going into effect as to Larry Glad, because the Bond
was written to reflect the bonding company's intent not to
accept risk of loss related to any employee previously
known to the Savings and Loan as dishonest.

With regard to

an employee already known to be dishonest, coverage is void
from the inception of the policy, i.e., it is void ab
initio.

Section 11 of the Bond provides in part:
This bond shall be deemed terminated or
cancelled as to any Employee - (a) as soon
as the Insured shall learn of any dishonest
or fraudulent act on the part of such
Employee . . . .

(Tr. Ex. 343, copy included at Exhibit Addendum Tab 343.)
However, the trial court refused to enforce
Section 11 of the Bond as a matter of law.
at 2909.10; 2909.34-.35.)

(See R.

The trial court said Section 11

seems "baffling and inconsistent" and would permit the bonding
company to "take premiums for not insuring people."
2906.27-.29.)

(R. at

Nevertheless, in response to Special

Interrogatories Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, which were submitted to
the jury solely to preserve its factual determination on this
point, the jury in this case found:
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(5) Home Savings learned

of a dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of Larry Glad
prior to December 29, 1981 (the date when he was terminated
from employment at Home Savings and six and one-half months
before the Bond was purchased); (6) the dishonest or fraudulent
act occurred after Larry Glad became employed by Home Savings;
(7) the dishonest or fraudulent act was not related to the AFCO
investor loans; and (8) Home Savings first learned of such
dishonest or fraudulent act about mid-December, 1981.

(See

Jury's Answers to Special Interrogatories 5-8, R. at 1351-1354;
copy included at Document Addendum D.)

The Bond, of course,

was not even purchased until July 14, 1982, seven months later.
Section 11 of the Bond protects the bonding company
from coverage exposure after the insured learns that an
employee is dishonest.

Once an employer is on notice of a

dishonest employee, the insurance company cannot be required to
indemnify losses resulting from similar subsequent conduct by
that same employee.

Likewise, an employer cannot lure a new

bonding company not previously involved in insuring a known
dishonest employee into writing a bond to cover that employee,
especially if the Savings and Loan knows that employee to have
been involved in possible losses and has not disclosed that
information to the bonding company.

Yet, that is exactly what

the trial court sanctioned with its ruling on Section 11 of the
Aetna Bond.
If there were any fidelity coverage for losses
resulting from Larry Glad's conduct, then it should have been
under F&D's bond (see Depo. Ex. 116 in Exhibit Addendum), which
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was in place when Larry Glad's conduct occurred, when Home
Savings learned of his conduct, and when Home Savings began
experiencing actual losses and lawsuits regarding loans in
which Larry Glad was involved.

It is unconscionable to permit

Home Savings to pass its losses on to Aetna, when it should
have protected its position and preserved its rights under the
F&D bond by simply giving notice to F&D when the dishonesty of
Larry Glad was discovered, or at the very latest in March and
April 1982, when the AFCO investors refused to make their
payments and initiated litigation.

B.

The Law of Section 11.
Aetna's position is nearly identical to the situation

presented in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Central
Bank of Houston, 672 S.W. 2d 641 (Tex. App. 1984).

In that

case, a bank sought fidelity bond coverage for loan losses that
resulted from the dishonest acts of its former president,
Joseph P. DeLorenzo.

That bond included a Section 11 identical

to Section 11 of the Aetna Bond.

The only factual difference

between the two cases is that the bond under which Central Bank
of Houston sought fidelity coverage was a renewal of a prior
bond with that same insurer, F&C of New York.

In contrast, the

Aetna Bond was entirely new coverage which was issued to
replace an F&D of Maryland Bond scheduled to expire on June 21,
1982, three weeks before Home Savings purchased coverage from
Aetna.
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Nevertheless, the jury in Central Bank found and
the Court of Appeals affirmed that the directors of the bank
had learned of other acts of dishonesty on the part of Central
Bank's president prior to the effective date of the renewal
bond.

Based upon that finding, the Texas Court of Appeals held

that "upon learning of those acts, coverage as to Defendant
DeLorenzo immediately terminated."

Id.

at 646.

That court

held:
The jury's answer to special issue sixteen
did not absolve appellant of liability for
losses occurring after October, 1974
because the renewal bond which was issued
December 11, 1974, was void from its
inception. Rather, appellant is absolved
of liability for these losses because a
renewal policy does not reinstate coverage
for an employee that had already been
terminated by a known dishonest act; it
simply continues whatever coverage existed
at the time of renewal. To hold otherwise
would be contrary to the principle that an
insurer does not agree to insure a bank
from losses caused by an officer known to
be dishonest prior to the losses.
672 S.W. 2d at 647 (citation omitted, emphasis added.)
That holding is directly applicable to the present
case.

In both cases, the juries found that the lending

institution learned of dishonest acts on the part of an
employee prior to the purchase of a new bond.
the bond is identical in both cases.

Section 11 of

The trial court was wrong

in reinstating coverage for Larry Glad under the Aetna Bond
where coverage had terminated as to Larry Glad under the prior
F&D bond as of mid-December 1981.

The trial court's legal

conclusion is simply not defensible.
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Similarly, in Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970), an insurance policy
provided an exclusion from coverage for any employee who was
known by the insured to have committed any fraudulent or
dishonest act.

The court found that it was undisputed that the

insured knew of a dishonest act by the subject employee which
occurred prior to his becoming employed by the insured.
Therefore, the court held that coverage must be defeated
ab initio.

The court further ruled that such an

exclusionary clause was reasonable and valid.
In this case, Aetna's counsel attempted by inference
to explain the operation of Section 11 to the jury during
opening statement (October 27, 1989, Tr. Trans., R. at 2921.80)
and closing argument (November 24, 1989, Tr. Trans., R. at
2917.211-.215).

But the trial court had previously articulated

its position that Section 11 would not be allowed to defeat
coverage (see, e.g., Transcript of October 20, 1987 hearing
on Motion for Directed Verdict, R. at 2912.207-.210; see
also R. at 2909/10, .34-.35; and 2906.27-.29), and it
prevented complete explanation of this provision to the jury.
(R. at 2917.59-.60; defendant's proposed Jury Instructions 8, 9
and 32, R. at 1233, 1234, and 1213.)
The result of the trial court's position on this
issue is evident in the form and content of the jury
instructions, special verdict and special interrogatories, as
well as the court's judgment for Home Savings despite the
jury's answers to Special Interrogatories 5-8.
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The trial court

refused, over Aetna's objection, to give proffered
instructions 8, 9, and 32 (R. at 2917.59-60; R. at 1233, 1234,
and 1213, copies included at Document Addendum F to Aetna's
Appellant's Brief), so the jury had no instruction on whether
it could consider the Section 11 issue and, if so, how it
should go about deciding it, or what the effect of its findings
would be.

The trial court also refused to include a Section 11

issue identifiable to the jury in any portion of the Special
Verdict.

(A copy of the Special Verdict proposed by Aetna (R.

at 1218-1223) is included at Document Addendum H to Aetna's
Appellant's Brief.)
Section 11 was included subliminally in the Special
Interrogatories as Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8.

The trial court only

included those Special Interrogatories to avoid the necessity
of retrial if it were reversed on appeal based on the jurors'
legal interpretation of Section 11.

(Transcript of October 20,

1987 hearing, R. at 2912.207-.210.)

Nevertheless, the jury's

answers on Special Interrogatory Nos. 5-8 reflect its common
sense intention that Aetna should prevail on the public policy
embodied in Section 11.

By responding as they did, the jury

concluded that Aetna would prevail because Home Savings knew of
Larry Glad's dishonesty many months before Aetna wrote the
Bond.

(See also Juror Affidavits, R. at 2032-2053, and

2055-2057; copies are included at Document Addendum J.)
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C. Summary.
The reasoning of the courts in Central Bank and
Ritchie Grocer is sound and directly applicable to the
case at bar.

A savings and loan institution should not be able

to obtain fidelity coverage for an employee who is known to
have been dishonest and who was fired for that dishonesty seven
months before the Bond was purchased.

In this case, the jury

concluded that preventing Home Savings from taking advantage of
Aetna in this manner was the appropriate resolution, and it
made specific findings consistent with that approach.

The

integrity of these jury findings should be upheld, and the
validity of the Central Bank and Ritchie Grocer reasoning
should be adopted by this court.
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POINT II
HOME SAVINGS IS NOT COVERED UNDER AETNA'S FIDELITY
BOND FOR ANY LOSS CAUSED BY LARRY GLAD BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF DISCOVERED ITS LOSS PRIOR TO THE
PERIOD OF THE BOND
A.

The Motion for Summary Judgment on Discovery of Loss,
On July 31, 1987, Aetna moved for summary judgment

because Home Savings had discovered the likelihood of its
impending loss prior to the period of coverage provided in the
Bond.

In addition, prior to its purchase of Aetna's Bond, Home

Savings had received notice from third parties, through
letters, lawsuits, and bank examinations, of claims involving
fraud and dishonesty.

After extensive briefs and oral

argument, the trial court denied Aetna's motion on August 25,
1987.

(R. at p. 344.)

The court's ruling (a copy is included

at Tab I of Document Addendum) states that although "the
dishonesty of [its] employee, Larry Glad, was known before the
policy period commenced," Home Savings did not discover a "loss
sustained" until "the judgment in or settlement of the
Armitage case" when Aetna's Bond was in effect.

This is an

erroneous legal conclusion which is entitled to de novo
review on the merits.

B.

Discovery-Type Coverage.
The proper interpretation of the Bond must start with

its language.

According to the preamble, there is coverage
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"with respect to loss sustained by the insured at any time
but discovered during the Bond Period . . . ."
added.)

(Emphasis

An important Rider to the Bond on form SR 6091

provides for the insured's discovery to occur in either of two
separate ways.

Objectively:

Discovery occurs when the insured becomes
aware of facts which would cause a
reasonable person to assume that a loss
covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred even though the exact amount or
details of loss may not be then known.
or, per se:
Notice to the insured of an actual or
potential claim by a third party which
alleges that the insured is liable under
circumstances, which, if true, would create a
loss under this bond constitutes such
discovery.
(Emphasis added.)
The Bond on Standard Form 22 provides fidelity
coverage which is common in the financial industry.

(Banks are

frequently covered by Bankers Blanket Bond, Standard Form
No. 24.)

The policy is called a "discovery bond," as

distinguished from an "occurrences bond," which would cover any
insured event that occurs within the period of the bond, no
matter when the insured becomes aware of that event.

See,

e.g., USLIFE Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp.,
115 Cal. App. 2d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1981).
Under a discovery bond, discovery of loss "means the
date the fraud was discovered by the Bank - not the date the
Bank was called upon to make good the loss."

Federal Deposit

Insurance Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 729,
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739 (5th Cir. 1970).

Loss refers to the awareness of

conditions out of which a claim may arise, not to the insured's
adjudicated liability for that loss.
2d § 49:216 (1982).

13A Couch on Insurance

Under the objective standard, discovery

occurs when "a reasonable insured would understand the
significance of [the facts] connoting the commission of a
fraud."

Perkins v. Clinton State Bank, supra, 593 F.2d

327, 334 (8th Cir. 1979).
"Despite the years of litigation, the definition set
forth in American Sur. Co. of New York v. Pauly, 170 U.S.
133, 18 S.Ct. 552, 42 L.Ed. 977 (1898), continues to reappear
as the basic yardstick" on the meaning of discovery of loss.
Alfalfa Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 376
F.Supp. 901, 906 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
Paraphrased, 'discovery1 means that time
when the insured gains sufficient factual
knowledge, not mere suspicion, which would
justify a careful and prudent man [sic]
in charging another with dishonesty.
Id. at 906. Accord:

Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan,

Olmstead Etc., 83 Cal. App. 3d 593, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1978);
USLIFE Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp., 115 Cal.
App. 2d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1981); Perkins v.
Clinton State Bank, 593 F.2d 327, 334 (8th Cir. 1979); First
Nat'l. Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty Co., 41 Colo. App.
195, 581 P.2d 744, 745 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360,
364-65 (8th Cir. 1971); and National Newark & Essex Bank v.
American Ins. Co., 76 N.J. 64, 385 A.2d 1216, 1224 (1978).
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Under the Bond's per se standard of discovery,
notice to the insured by third parties of actual or potential
claims which, if true, would give rise to a loss covered by the
bond, "constitutes such discovery."

Rider 6091.

By either the

objective or per se definition, Home Savings definitely
discovered the loss prior to June 21, 1982, the date the Bond
became effective.
C.

Home Savings' Knowledge of Larry Glad's Dishonesty and
Discovery of its Loss.
In its Amended Complaint, Home Savings alleged that

its employee, Larry Glad, committed certain dishonest or
fraudulent acts.

This conduct all occurred in October,

November, and December 1981, consistent with the allegations
contained in paragraph 9 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
at pp. 16-18.)

(R.

Assuming the conduct constitutes "dishonesty"

as defined by the Bond, both the conduct and the actual and
reasonably anticipated loss from the AFCO investor loans, were
extensively known by Home Savings long before it purchased the
Bond.

The facts which were submitted to the trial court in

support of Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment, and which were
substantiated at trial, are itemized in paragraph 2 of the
Statement of Facts, above.
The three lawsuits filed against Home Savings merit
additional detail.

On March 26, 1982, a complaint was filed by

David and Patricia Bott against Home Savings in Box Elder
County, Utah (Civil No. 17132).

The Bott Complaint was

answered by Home Savings on April 28, 1982.
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(Tr. Exs. 356 and

357.)

Pages 3, 4 and 5 of the Bott Complaint contain a

narrative recitation of the very irregularities in the AFCO
investor second mortgage loans which later formed the basis of
the judgment in Armitage.
On April 7, 1982, approximately three hundred (300)
AFCO investors filed a complaint in the United States
Bankruptcy Court against Home Savings and other financial
institutions.
al.

(See Alcorn, et al. v. Grant C. Affleck, et

Complaint, Adversary Proceeding No. 82-0333, Tr.

Ex. 358.)

The Alcorn Complaint was served on Home Savings1

President, Howard Bradshaw, on April 13, 1982.
Tr. Ex. 359.)

(See

Pages 20 through 26 of the Alcorn Complaint

(see particularly para. 23 at p. 25) alleged Home Savings'
improper association and involvement in the sale and
distribution of the AFCO securities, as well as its commission
of common law fraud and its departure from conventional and
standard lending practices.
The Alcorn Complaint was dismissed on Home Savings1
motion (R. at 3072-80) on July 21, 1982, for lack of Bankruptcy
Court jurisdiction.

(R. at 3070.)

On July 22, 1982, it was

refiled (with a few new plaintiff and defendant parties) in the
Federal District Court for the District of Utah as Abbott, et
al. v. Carvel Shaffer, et al., Civil No. C82-0628K.

Abbott

v. Shaffer was severed for trial against individual
lender/defendants.

That complaint was the basis of the

Armitage v. Home Savings trial and judgment.
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On April 29, 1982, a complaint was filed by Richard
and Barbara Clifford against Home Savings in the District Court
for Davis County, Utah.

(Tr. Ex. 360.)

A copy of that

complaint, as well as an accompanying Restraining Order and
Order to Show Cause, were served on Home Savings on April 30,
1982.

(R. at 3087.)

Pages 1 through 4 of the Clifford

Complaint contain numerous specific allegations with regard to
loan processing and closing irregularities by Home Savings as
to the Clifford transaction and also as to forty (40)
additional AFCO investor loan transactions with Home Savings &
Loan.
Each of the facts recited in paragraph 2 of the
Statement of Facts would alone constitute objective discovery
of loss prior to the issuance of Aetna's Bond.

The letters

from third parties, the lawsuits, and the FHLBB Report of
Examination each also constitute discovery of loss under the
Bond's per se standard, which is satisfied by notice of
"actual or potential claim by a third party which
alleges . . . circumstances, which, if true, would create a
loss under the bond."

(Rider 6091.)

The third-party

allegations and notices were tried in the Armitage case, and
the jury there found them to be true.

There could be no

clearer test of per se discovery.
Neither the Bond nor the law require that for
discovery of loss to have occurred, the insured must be
certain about the loss.

The Bond's objective standard of

discovery only requires that a reasonable person would have
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cause to "assume" that a loss had been or would be incurred
"even though the exact amount or details of loss may not then
be known."

Rider SR 6091.

The case law is in accord.

See,

e.g., USLIFE v. National Sur. Corp., supra, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 398.
No objective or per se factors changed between
the first half of 1982 and the month of December 1982 when Home
Savings finally gave notice to both Aetna and F&D that lawsuits
from the AFCO scheme were then pending against it.

The

December 1982 letters from Home Savings' counsel (Tr. Exs. 119
and 12 0, copies included at Tab 119 and 12 0 of Exhibit
Addendum) notifying Aetna of pending claims do not contain one
shred of information which was not actually known to Home
Savings prior to June 21, 1982, when the Bond went into
effect.

Home Savings admitted in its report to the FHLBB of

Violations of Criminal Statutes (Tr. Ex. 226A; copy included at
Tab 226A of Exhibit Addendum) that it was put on notice on
April 7, 1982, of all the significant irregularities in the
AFCO investor loan program.

This notice was imparted to Home

Savings by the allegations in the massive Alcorn v. Affleck
lawsuit.

D.

Conclusion.
The trial court considered the evidence at summary

judgment and ruled as a matter of law that before Home Savings
purchased the Aetna Bond, it was aware of Larry Glad's conduct
and the problems with the AFCO investor loans.
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But then the

trial court improperly ruled, also as a matter of law, that it
was the timing of the "loss sustained" which triggered coverage
under the Bond.

After that misreading of the Bond, the trial

court either did not perceive or else neglected to address the
per se standard of discovery altogether.

The Bond should

be enforced as written, consistent with the interpretation of
courts throughout the country.
In response to Special Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4,
the jury in this case found that Home Savings had omitted or
misrepresented material information in applying for the Aetna
Bond.

(See Point III, below.)

result is that the jury —
person —

A primary explanation for this

the final arbiter of the reasonable

had concluded that Home Savings had enough

information before it purchased the Aetna Bond reasonably to
assume that a covered loss had or would have occurred with the
AFCO investor loans.
sustained.

The determination of the jury should be

The decision of the trial court should be reversed

with remand for entry of judgment in favor of Aetna.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING
THE JURY'S RESPONSES ON SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 AND ENTERING
A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY'S RESPONSES
The Utah insurance statute governing the Bond
application process in this case, U.C.A. § 31-19-8(1) (1974
ed.), prevents recovery by an insured if the insured made
misrepresentations or omissions in the application, provided
such were either fraudulent or material or that the insurer
would not have issued the coverage if it had known the facts.
The jury below found two of those three elements - materiality
and that Aetna would not have issued the coverage.
court mistakenly set aside those jury findings.

The trial

In order to do

so, the court erred by misinterpreting the statute to require
both materiality and that the insurer would not have issued the
coverage.

The court agreed that there was an evidentiary basis

for materiality, which taken alone required judgment for Aetna,
but then erred again by requiring the third element as well as
finding an insufficient basis for the jury's conclusion that
Aetna would not have issued the coverage.

A.

The Jury's Determination and the Supporting Evidence.
The jury answered Special Interrogatories 2 and 4

pertaining to Home Savings' misrepresentations in the Bond
application process (see R. at 1352-1353, attached at Document
Addendum D).

The jury found that Home Savings made

"unintentional" misrepresentations or omissions of facts were
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known by Home Savings, which materially affected Aetna's
risks under the Bond, and that Aetna would not have issued
the Bond or would have excluded the risk disclosed if it had
known those facts.

(See Jury's Answer to Special

Interrogatory No. 2, R. at 1352.)

In addition, the jury found

that Home Savings failed ("unintentionally'1) to disclose
material facts known by Home Savings beyond those requested on
the Application Questionnaire.

(See Jury's Answer to Special

Interrogatory No. 4, R. at 1352-1353.)
In the trial court's Memorandum Decision of March 4,
1988 at 9-14 (R. at 2066-2071), the court concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to support those findings, and set
the jury decision aside.

Instead of following the statutory

mandate requiring only one of the requisite elements and
reviewing the entire body of evidence to determine whether
there was an adequate basis for the jury's decision, the trial
court ruled that the testimony of Don Bradshaw, an independent
insurance agent, and David Robinson, Aetna's bond underwriter,
was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the
information was "material" to Aetna.

(R. at 2068-2070.)

Setting aside the jury decision was improper.

The

jury determined unanimously that it had sufficient information
to conclude that Home Savings had failed to provide information
to Aetna, which it should have provided, and which would have
resulted in Aetna's refusing to write the Bond coverage.
at 2917.248-.260; 1351-1353.)

(R.

The jury heard evidence

throughout the four and one-half week trial that long before
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Home Savings purchased the Bond, its management was aware of
Larry Glad's dishonesty, as well as the actual or potential
losses on the AFCO investor loans.
Statement of Facts, above.)

(See paragraph 2 of

Furthermore, Mr. Bradshaw and

Mr. Robinson specifically testified about the issue of
materiality.
David Robinson, Aetna's bond underwriting manager,
testified that if Aetna had received accurate responses from
Home Savings on the application regarding loan procedures in
place at Home Savings, Aetna would have issued an interpretive
letter limiting coverage (R. at 2916-11, .20-.23, .51-.52); if
Home Savings had disclosed the firing of Larry Glad or the
contents of Grant Affleck's letter (Trial Exhibit 20), Aetna
would have re-examined writing the Bond at all (R. at 2916.23
-.24); and if Aetna had known of the AFCO bankruptcy, attorney
letters and lawsuits, it would not have written the Bond (R.
at 2916.24-.25).

Mr. Robinson also explained that Aetna's risk

was greatly increased by Home Savings' undisclosed problems
with regulators, insider abuse, deviations from standard
practices, and potential claims.

(R. at 2916.25 -.26.)

Don Bradshaw, the agent who wrote the Bond, but who also had
close ties with Home Savings, testified that he would not have
taken the application if he had known of any possible claims
Home Savings might make (R. at 2916.67), or of claimed fraud
and dishonesty with regard to the AFCO investor loans (id. at
.56-.57, .60), or of Larry Glad's firing (id. at .65), or of
Home Savings' reserve for uncollected interest on the loans
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tied to possible dishonesty (id. at .60-.71).

However, it

was also apparent from the mass of other trial evidence that
the misrepresented and undisclosed facts would be material to
anyone issuing a bond that might cover that very subject matter
about which Home Savings had so much information and notice.
Normally, a judge cannot intervene in the jury's
factual decisions.

A jury determination must be upheld if it

is "supported by substantial competent evidence."

Canyon

Country Store v. Bracey, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,21 (Utah
1989) .

The trial court did not meet the very high standard

that is required before allowing such intervention.

B. The Statutory Standard.
The misrepresentation issue is governed by Utah's
statute on insurance applications.

The statute in effect

during July of 1982, when Home Savings applied for the Bond,
was Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1)(1974).

It provided as follows:

31-19-8. REPRESENTATIONS IN APPLICATIONS (1) All statements and descriptions in any
application for an insurance policy or
annuity contract, or for the reinstatement
or renewal thereof, by or in behalf of the
insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be
representations and not warranties.
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment
of facts, and incorrect statements shall
not prevent a recovery under the policy or
contract unless:
(a)

fraudulent; or

(b) material either to the acceptance
of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by
the insurer; or
(c) The insurer in good faith either
would not have issued the policy or
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contract, or would not have issued,
reinstated or renewed it at the same
premium rate, or would not have issued ,
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract
in as large an amount, or would not have
provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the insurer as
required either by the application for the
policy or contract or otherwise.
In Jury Instruction No. 33, the Court instructed the
jury with regard to this issue as follows:
Aetna also claims that there were
unintentional misrepresentations or
nondisclosure of facts known by Home
Savings on the application questionnaire
which facts materially affected its risks
under the bond and that it would not have
issued the bond or would have excluded the
risk disclosed if it had known these
facts. Aetna must establish each aspect of
this claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
(R. at 1335.)

In special Jury Interrogatory No. 2, the jury

was asked to answer the following question:
In accordance with the standard of proof
required in Numbered Paragraph 2 of Jury
Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove that
there were unintentional misrepresentations
or nondisclosure of facts known by Home
Savings on the application questionnaire
which facts materially affected its risks
under the bond and that it would not
have issued the bond or would have
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known
these facts?
(Emphasis added).

The jury answered this Interrogatory, "Yes,"

finding both materiality and that Aetna would not have
written this coverage if it had known the same facts as Home
Savings.
In the trial court's post-trial Memorandum Decision
of March 4, 1988, the court improperly ruled that the "statute
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provides that factual omissions in an application for insurance
shall not prevent recovery unless the facts are material and
would have resulted in the insurer not issuing the policy or
excluding the risk disclosed. . . . "
(emphasis added.)

(R. at 2067-2068)

The court went on to find that

Mr. Bradshaw's testimony provided "an evidentiary basis for the
materiality of the information known by Home" (R. at 2068), but
that neither Mr. Bradshaw nor Mr. Robinson's testimony was
sufficient to establish the third element.

The trial court

overlooked the fact that only one element need be established.
The Utah Supreme Court has decided a case virtually
on all fours with the jury verdict herein, Berger v. Minnesota
Mutual Life Insurance Co.# 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986).

In

Berger, the plaintiff's deceased husband had obtained a
credit life insurance policy from the defendant.

The jury

found that the decedent had made misrepresentations in the
application which were "false but not fraudulently made."
Id. at 389.

The jury also found both materiality and that

the insurer would not have issued the coverage if it had known
the facts.
The Berger court held that just one of the
statutory elements need be established in order to defeat
coverage:
The statutory alternatives are stated in
the disjunctive/ not the conjunctive. In
order to invalidate a policy because of a
misrepresentation by the insured, an
insurer need prove applicable only one of
the above provisions.
Id. at 390 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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In the present case, as in Berger, the
misrepresentations made by Home Savings were false but not
fraudulently made.

The jury did not find the first statutory

element, fraud, but it found both of the other two elements.
The Berger holdings were subsequently followed in
Hardy v. Prudential Insurance Co., 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988).
In Hardy, the court again held that the statutory elements
are stated in the disjunctive, so only one element need be
proven for the insurer to prevail.

Id. at 765-66.

As noted in Berger, five other states have statutes
virtually identical to the Utah statute applicable to this
case.

A number of decisions interpreting those statutes have

been issued in harmony with Berger.

Coppin v. Shelter Mut.

Ins. Co., 742 P.2d 594 (Okla. Ct. App., 1987); Matthews v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 372, 443 P.2d 456, 460 (1968)
("A contract of insurance, and the liability of an insurer, may
be avoided by reason of . . . a misstatement of matters
material to the risk.11); Wardle v. Int'l. Health & Life Ins.
Co., 97 Idaho 668, 551 P.2d 623 (1976); Kentner v. Gulf Ins.
Co., 297 Or. 470, 686 P.2d 339, 343 (1984) (modified at 689
P.2d 955 (Or. 1984)); Hollinger v. Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Co., 192 Colo. 377, 560 P.2d 824, 827 (Colo. 1977).
In the present case, the jury went far beyond the
statutory minimum elements by finding that the facts known by
Home Savings were material, and that Aetna would not have
issued the bond or would have restricted coverage if it had
known those facts.

Therefore, the additional reference in the
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Special Interrogatory to the "unintentional" nature of the
misrepresentations is superfluous.

C.

The Common Law Standard.
Home Savings had a common law obligation to

disclose all information to Aetna which was material to the
risk undertaken by Aetna in issuing the fidelity bond to Home.
Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, 73 Cal. Rptr. 564, 447 P.2d
956 (Cal. 1968); Phoenix Sav. and Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
and Sur. Co., 266 F.Supp. 465 (D.C. Md. 1966); West Am. Fin.
Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 61 P.2d 963 (Cal. App. 1936).
Under this common law duty, Home Savings had an obligation to
divulge any and all material information, even if not
specifically requested by Aetna, which directly affected
Aetna's risk in issuing the Bond.

A brief review of the three

foregoing cases demonstrates that Home Savings breached its
common law duty at the time it purchased the Bond by failing to
disclose what it knew of Larry Glad's misconduct and of its
actual and potential losses on the AFCO investor loans.
In West Am. Fin. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., and
Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, the California court
carefully articulated the common law obligation imposed upon an
insured when applying for a fidelity bond:
[I]t may be said to be a fundamental
principle of the law of fidelity guaranty
that if dishonesty of an agent, whose
fidelity was guaranteed under a bond,
exists before or at the time the surety on
the bond becomes bound thereby, and the
principal conceals it from the surety at
the time of obtaining the fidelity bond,
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the surety is not liable for the losses
resulting therefrom . . . the mere
nondisclosure of the circumstances
affecting the situation of the parties
which are material for the surety to be
acquainted with and are within the
knowledge of the person obtaining the
surety bond, is undue concealment even
though not willful or intentional or with a
view to any advantage to himself,
61 P.2d 963, 968 (emphasis added); 447 P.2d 956, 960. In
Sumitomo Bank, the California court stated that this "rule
imposes an absolute duty upon the obligee to volunteer
disclosure of all facts materially affecting the risk to the
surety on a fidelity bond."

Id. (emphasis added.)

The court

concluded that " [irrespective of motive or intent, mere
non-disclosure of facts known by the obligee which materially
affect the surety's risk, such as prior dishonesty of the
principal on the fidelity bond, therefore discharges the
surety."

Id.
These same common law principles were applied by the

Maryland Federal District Court in Phoenix Savings and Loan
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.

In addition, the court

in Phoenix Savings held that a fidelity bond identical to the
one involved in the present case would be deemed null and void
due to misrepresentations in the application procedure that
were entirely innocent and unintentional.

Specifically, the

officer completing the guestionnaire was charged with the
knowledge of all officers and directors in providing complete
and accurate information on the application.
470.

266 F. Supp. at

(Compare Bond Rider SR 5538, Trial Exhibit 343, at
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Tab 343 of the Exhibit Addendum, imputing knowledge of "any
partner or officer" to the principal insured.)
Home breached its common law obligation to divulge
all material information by failing to disclose the AFCO
investor loans and the tremendous amount of activity pertaining
to those loans at the time of and preceding the application
process.

Question 17 on the application form (Tr. Ex. 122)

specifically requested information regarding losses, and since
Home was already booking and experiencing losses related to
these loans, it was obligated to disclose those to Aetna.

This

type of information is precisely what the California and
Maryland courts held was vital and material to the suretyfs
decision of whether or not to insure.

D.

Summary.
The jury in this case made its determination of

material misrepresentation and omission based on ample
evidence.

That determination should not have been overridden

by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals should reverse the

trial court and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of
"no cause of action" in favor of Aetna.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED HOME SAVINGS
TO RECOVER UNDER AETNA'S BOND THOSE LOSSES FROM
THE AFCO INVESTOR LOANS WHICH RESULTED FROM HOME SAVINGS1
VIOLATIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS,
A.

Motion for Summary Judgment on the Bond's Trading
Exclusion Rider,
The Bond includes Rider SR 6030a, which excludes from

coverage any loss resulting directly or indirectly from trading
in securities.

(See Tr. Ex. 343 p. 22.)

On August 31,

1987, Aetna moved for summary judgment to exclude bond coverage
for that portion of the Armitage judgment which arose from
Home Savings1 violations of state and federal security laws.
Aetna's motion was supported by what the trial court called
"the undisputed facts" (R. 331), including selected jury
instructions and Special Verdict Form from the Armitage
trial, as well as an affidavit from Francis X. LeMunyon, a Vice
President of the Surety Association of America.

(Copies of the

Armitage jury instructions, Armitage Special Verdict Form,
and the LeMunyon Affidavit are included as Document
Addendums K, E, and L, respectively, to Aetna's Appellant's
Brief.)

(These Addendum documents are included in the Record

at R. 210 through 210.87.)
By Minute Entry dated August 19, 1987 (a copy is
included as Document Addendum M to Aetna's Appellant's Brief),
the trial court denied Aetna's motion, in spite of its correct
conclusion that "while no reference [in Rider SR 603 0a"; is made
to trading in securities, . . no reasonable person could
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believe that the Rider has reference to anything but
securities.11

The trial court's ruling turned on a semantical

declaration which was not supported by reasoned analysis or
legal authority.

It simply reads:

The nature of the evidence, jury
instructions and verdict in Armitage
necessarily requires the nomenclature
'involved in the sale or exchange of
securities' to characterize Home's conduct
and the jury's findings. Such
'involvement,' however does not necessarily
equate to 'trading' in securities as that
term is used in rider SR 6030a.
The trial court's decision overlooks the important language in
Rider SR 603 0a which excludes "loss resulting directly or
indirectly in trading."

B.

The Text and History of the Trading Exclusion.
Rider SR 6030a reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The underwriter shall not be liable
under the attached bond for any loss
resulting directly or indirectly from
trading, with or without the knowledge of
the Insured, in the name of the Insured or
otherwise, . . .

By its express terms, Rider SR 6030a is specifically "FOR USE
WITH BLANKET BONDS, STANDARD FORMS NOS. 5, 22, 24, AND 28.
'DISCOVERY' FORMS TO DELETE TRADING LOSS COVERAGE."
Paragraph 2 of Rider 6030a says "[t]his rider applies to loss
sustained at any time but discovered after 12:01 a.m. on
June 21, 1982" when the Bond went into effect.
The Savings and Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form
No. 22, and its related riders

were drafted by the Surety

Association of America ("SAA").

The SAA is a non-profit
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association of insurance companies which provide surety and
indemnity coverage throughout the country.

In preparing

standard insurance policies, the SAA works with trade
associations for those industries which are affected by the
coverage contained in any given form, such as the American
Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings and Loan
Associations.

(LeMunyon Affidavit at paragraphs 1 through 4,

R. at 210.10-.12.)

The trading exclusion rider was designed to

cover activities involving the sale, purchase and trade of
securities, and it pertains to losses resulting from either
legal or illegal trading in securities.

(LeMunyon Affidavit at

paragraph 11.)
The trading exclusion rider functions as an
affirmative limitation on policy coverage.

An insured can

override the trading exclusion by purchasing an exemption under
another Bond Rider SR-6085 and paying appropriately higher
premiums.

(See July 27, 1987 letter from Francis X. LeMunyon,

together with attached filing letter to Utah Insurance
Department, all at Document Addendum N to Aetna's Appellant's
Brief.

R. 210.45-.47.)

Home did not purchase extended

coverage for losses resulting from trading in securities.
(LeMunyon Affidavit at paragraphs 12 and 13.)

C.

The Law of Trading Exclusions.
The trading exclusion under Rider 6030a was

considered and interpreted in the case of Shearson/American
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Express v. First Continental Bank and Trust Co., 579 F. Supp.
1305 (W.D. Mo. 1984) in the context of a Banker's Blanket Bond
Form No. 24. As that case explains, the trading exclusion was
adopted in the 1970fs from the terms of insurance coverage then
commonly issued only to stockbrokers.

Shearson/American

Express at 1310, citing Digest of Bank Insurance, 35 (3d ed.
1977.)

(See also LeMunyon Affidavit, paragraph 9.)

The

trading exclusion was added to Blanket Bond Standard Forms 22
and 24 because of the increased involvement of financial
institutions in the sale or exchange of securities.

(LeMunyon

Affidavit at paragraphs 10 and 11); Shearson/American Express
at 310, citing Digest of Bank Insurance, 35 (3d ed. 1977).
The gradual deregulation of the financial industry
which occurred in the 1970's resulted in increased activity by
banks and by savings and loans in the sale, purchase and
exchange of securities.

The high risk of loss associated with

this new activity was not originally taken into consideration
by underwriters in calculating appropriate premiums.
Therefore, both the American Surety Association, and the
American Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings &
Loan Associations, felt that those financial institutions which
traded in securities, either directly or indirectly, should pay
additional premiums for the attendant increased risk.

Id.

In like manner, the premiums of financial institutions which do
not engage, either directly or indirectly in the purchase or
sale of securities, reflect a lower level of risk assumption by
the fidelity insurers.

(LeMunyon Affidavit, paragraphs 10
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through 13); Shearson/American Express at 1311, citing
Digest of Bank Insurance, 1.3.33 (4th ed. 1981).

D.

The Armitage Judgment —

The Cause of Home Savings1 Loss.

Home Savings' loss resulted from the Armitage jury
verdict which found Home Savings primarily and secondarily
liable for fraud involved in the sale or exchange of
securities.

The Armitage jury could not have found Home

liable on the counts of primary and secondary securities
violations without finding for each count of the verdict that
it traded either directly or indirectly in securities.

The

Armitage jury instructions (see Document Addendum K) are
conclusive on this point.

They are summarized as follows:

1.
as a matter of law, the AFCO
promissory notes given to the AFCO
investors were securities. (Armitage
instructions 5.03 and 6.03.)
2.
with respect to liability under
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193 3, an
essential element was the finding that Home
Savings was a "seller" of the AFCO
securities. (Armitage instruction 6.03.)
3.
in order to find Home Savings liable
for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, the jury must find
that Home Savings engaged in fraudulent
conduct "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of a security. (Armitage
instructions 7.0 through 7.4.)
4.
in order to find Home Savings liable
under § 61-1-22(1)(a) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act, Home Savings must have
offered or sold securities in violation of
§§ 3, 10 or 17 of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act. (Armitage
instructions 8.01 through 8.08.)
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5.
in order to find Home Savings liable
for secondary violations of the securities
laws, Home Savings had to have either
controlled or aided or abetted AFCO, its
agents or Grant Affleck, in the primary
violations by those parties of the state
and federal securities laws. (Armitage
instructions 12.01, .02, and .03.)
The Armitage judgment was based on Special Verdict
Forms entered by the jury pursuant to the foregoing
instructions.

Through its Special Verdicts, the jury found

Home liable on each of 36 separate AFCO investor loans for
three primary violations of the state and federal securities
fraud provisions.

In addition, the jury found Home secondarily

liable on the 3 6 AFCO investor loans both for controlling and
for aiding and abetting Grant Affleck and AFCO in their
violations of securities laws.
judgment accordingly.

The Armitage court entered

(Tr. Ex. 330; a copy is included at

Tab 330 of Exhibit Addendum.)
Although the Armitage special verdicts also found
Home liable for committing common law fraud and for violating
truth-in-lending provisions of federal and state law, Home's
commission of these improprieties necessarily occurred in the
context of its illegal trading in the AFCO securities.
Furthermore, the fact that Home was found liable for common law
fraud does not justify ignoring the operation of the trading
exclusion in light of Home Savings1 securities law violations.
In Judge Learned Hetnd's now-famous dicta in Irving Nat'l. Bank
v. Law, 10 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1926),

lf

if the decision of a

court on a point of law is based upon several grounds, each is
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equally authoritative on all, and no one is obiter."

Id. at

724.

E.

Conclusion.
The judgment should be reversed and remanded for a

determination of that portion of Home Savings1 losses in the
Armitage judgment which derived from trading directly or
indirectly in securities.

The damages in this case should be

reduced proportionately.
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POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER
THE BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT
OF HOME SAVINGS' OFFICERS AND BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AS THE CAUSE OF ITS LOSS.
A•

Evidence Establishing Home Savings' Bad Business Judgment
and Mismanagement.
The jury heard and saw a tremendous amount of

evidence at trial suggesting that Home Savings incurred
losses from the AFCO investor loans because of management's
conscious decision to enter into the AFCO investor loans and
its failure to follow federal and state lending guidelines,
industry-recognized safe and sound lending practices, and its
own internal procedures.
For example:

Fred Smolka, then Director, Executive

Vice President and Chief Operating Office of Home Savings,
testified that Larry Glad was not present at the first three
meetings between Grant Affleck and Home Savings' officers and
directors regarding the AFCO loan (R. at 2919.137, .154-.155,
.159); Larry Glad (through deposition testimony read to the
jury) testified that Affleck and his staff "had literally taken
over our office" to process the AFCO investor loans (R. at
2910.137); Home Savings' management was concerned about
entering into these loans, but did so anyway because they
thought the loans could be sold on the secondary market (Tr.
Ex. 39; Fred Smolka test., R. at 2919.185; David Richards
test., R. at 2907.179-.185; see also Larry Glad testimony,
R. at 2910.131, .137).

The loans were processed too quickly,
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in one to three days, instead of the usual two weeks to one
month (L. Glad test., R. at 2910.147); the loans were not
closed by a Home Savings officer at Home Savings' office
(F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.107-.Ill, 2920.13, .41-.42); and
the Board of Directors disregarded red flags that had been
raised about AFCO, Grant Affleck and the nature of the loans
(D. Richards test., R. at 2907.179-.183; F. Smolka test., R. at
2921.138, .140-.141, .161, 2919.8, .19, .35-.36, .146-.148,
.151-.153, .156-.157, .163-.165, .179-.182, 2920.5-.6, .13,
.41-.42).
All of Home Savings1 active involvement and its
blatant mismanagement is corroborated and described in detail
in the trial testimony of William Cox, Vice President in Charge
of Mortgage Lending, and Elaine Reese, as assistant secretary
of Home Savings and also the loan closing officer.

The essence

of their testimony is hard to improve upon by summary, so
copies of selected portions are included at Document Addendum 0
(Cox) and P (Reese).

Copies of agreements which Home Savings1

management entered into with Grant Affleck through negotiations
by its key officers (Tr. Exs. 8, 9, 10, and 11) are included at
Exhibit Addendum Tabs 8, 9, 10, and 11.

Copies of direct

(mis)representations by Home Savings' management to the AFCO
investors (Tr. Exs. 89 and 90) are included at Exhibit Addendum
Tabs 89 and 90.

In the entire trial, there was no evidence

that Larry Glad ever had any communication with any of the AFCO
investors, and none of the operative agreements between Home
Savings and AFCO were negotiated or entered into by Larry Glad.
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Aetna introduced testimony at trial from some of the
most knowledgeable experts in the country to establish that
Home Savings1 own bad business decisions and mismanagement were
the primary cause of Home Savings1 loss.

These witnesses also

reviewed and interpreted the FHLBB's multiple negative reports
on Home Savings1 activities and on FHLBB action taken against
Home Savings for those violations.

Aetna's experts were:

(1)

James Croft, the former Director of the FHLBB's Office of
Examinations and Supervision, author of books and articles in
the subject area, officer of a large Maryland Savings and Loan,
university professor and Savings and Loan consultant (R. at
2923.111-.114); (2) Elaine Weis, former Commissioner of the
Utah Department of Financial Institutions, Savings and Loan
consultant, and professor in the University of Utah Department
of Finances (R. at 2909.64-.74); and (3) Douglas McEachern,,
C.P.A., partner and National Director of Savings and Loan
Practice in the national accounting firm of Touche Ross and
Co., Chairman of the Committee for Savings and Loan Accounting
and Reporting in the American Institute of CPAs, and
representative for the accounting industry in several Savings
and Loan organizations. (R. at 2922.4-.7.)

All of these

experts testified that Home Savings was badly managed, that
management failed to follow both its own procedures and
industry standards, that the AFCO investor loans were bad loans
for Home Savings to make, and that management's decisions led
to Home Savings' loss.
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In the FHLBB's Report of Examination for Home Savings
dated June 4, 1982 (Tr. Ex. 196), the FHLBB found that
management had subjected Home Savings to possible losses and
lawsuits on the AFCO investor loans (see Elaine Weis test.,
R. at 2909.107-.109), that management had demonstrated an
"absence of sound procedures" and a "lack of supervision of
loan department personnel" (id. at 2909.123), that Home
Savings had demonstrated poor appraisal practices (id. at
2909.117), and that Home Savings had entered into the AFCO
investor loans in a manner inconsistent with its own
procedures, resulting in possible losses and lawsuits (id. at
2909.107-.109).

Home Savings1 management showed the same

course of mismanagement for a period of years both before and
after the AFCO loans.

(Tr. Exs. 191, 200, 206, 210, 211;

Elaine Weis testimony, R. at 2909.126-.131.)
In addition, Aetna's expert witnesses found a variety
of serious problems with the AFCO loans, unrelated to Larry
Glad's alleged dishonesty.

Many of those problems were

apparent on the face of the loan documents and should have
raised red flags for management, loan officers or others
reviewing the files.

Loan documentation on the loans was

received in many cases after the loan was made (E. Weis test.,
R. at 2909.91), AFCO was listed as the party ordering many
appraisals instead of Home Savings (id. at 2909.96), some
AFCO investors had apparently been turned down elsewhere on the
same loans (i^. at 2909.94-.95), and many AFCO investors
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showed payment-to-income and total obligations-to-income ratios
that were far too high (id. at 2909.92-.93).
As revealed in the FHLBB's 1981 and 1982 Exam
Reports, Home Savings demonstrated a pattern on conduct of
continued problems with meeting regulatory standards for loan
documentation, failures to meet the FHLBB underwriting
expectations, a high level of scheduled items (problem assets),
poor appraisal practices, and a lack of attention to detail.
(Testimony of James Croft, R. at 2923.120.)

Given that the

AFCO investor loans were more complicated and more difficult
than most loans, and given Home Savings' level of lending
experience, Home Savings should not have attempted this type of
transaction; management's attempt to enter into these types of
loans generated a high number of problem assets or scheduled
items.

(Id. at .121-.123.)

Ultimately, because of the types

of violations occurring in 1981 and 1982, the FHLBB took the
extraordinary action of entering into a Consent Cease and
Desist Order with Home Savings in 1986.

(Id. at .130-.134;

see Tr. Ex. 220.)
More specifically pertaining to the AFCO investor
loans, it was bad practice for management to allow a loan
solicitor (such as Larry Glad) to become involved in loan
processing, underwriting, approval and closing.
at .135-.138.)

(Id.

Mr. Croft also testified that because it was

apparent that the $100,000.00 loan to AFCO and the AFCO
investor loans were interrelated, the primary source of
repayment for the investor loans would be AFCO, and Home

-66-

Savings1 management should have carefully looked at AFCO's
ability to repay, including evaluating current audited
financial statements and AFCO's history as a business.
at .139-.142.)

(Id.

It was also unreasonable for Home Savings'

management to allow AFCO to process the investor loans (id.
at .145-.146); a one to three-day processing time was far too
fast to insure accurate information (id. at .146); it was
improper for Home Savings to allow AFCO to close loans outside
of Home Savings' office (_id. at .146-.147); and senior
management of Home Savings should have become much more
involved in administering these loans rather than allowing a
loan solicitor with a vested interested in closing the loans to
follow through on those loans (id. at .147).
The testimony of Mr. McEachern is best summarized in
defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 378 (summary at Document
Addendum G), which was prepared by Mr. McEachern and the
accounting firm of Touche Ross.

In the two pages constituting

Section 1 of that exhibit (id.)/ Mr. McEachern summarized the
36 AFCO investor loans and whether or not the loan
documentation in the Home Savings' file justified the making of
those loans on the face of that documentation.

He concluded

that one of those loans was appropriate, six possibly were
appropriate, but 29 should not have been made for one or more
of the following reasons:

the debt-service ratio was too high

for the subject borrower, the borrower had no liquid net worth,
and/or the payment on the new obligation resulted in too
dramatic an increase in payments owed by that borrower
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("payment shock").

(See, e.g., testimony of Douglas

McEachern, R. at 2922.29-.31.)

If management and the Home

Savings1 officer responsible for the loan approval process had
properly evaluated nothing more than the loan documentation in
their own files, they would not have made the vast majority of
these loans and Home Savings' ultimate loss would have been
avoided.
Home Savings' theory at trial was that Larry Glad's
dishonesty was so egregious that it "pervaded" the entire
series of AFCO investor loan transactions and made them
unenforceable.

If so, it argued it should not have to show

that each individual loan was unenforceable because of some
specific conduct of Larry Glad.
To the contrary, a case involving multiple
transactions requires apportionment of loss among various
causes.

This approach is mandated by Fidelity Sav. & Loan

Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1981).

That case involved a series of poorly performing loans

which, in conjunction with other factors, caused a bank to go
out of business.

The Ninth Circuit adopted the district

court's "logical and equitable apportionment between dishonesty
and other factors" which caused the bank to fail.

(Citing

Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp.,
440 F.Supp. 862, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd. 647 F.2d 933.)
The trial court committed prejudicial error by
allowing Home Savings to use the pervasive effect approach and
by precluding the jury from deciding whether loan losses could
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be allocated among the other possible causes, including Home's
mismanagement and bad business judgment.
over defense counsel's objections, by:

This error occurred,
(1) refusing to read

the jury a number of key instructions setting forth Aetna's
theory on causation (defendant's Requested Instructions 2 and
42, R. at 1227, 1996); (2) giving jury instructions that
inaccurately presented Aetna's defense (Jury Instruction 26-3 0,
R. at 1327-1331) ; (3) refusing to submit to the jury a Special
Verdict question addressing this issue, as requested by
defendant (defendant's requested Special Verdict, Question
No. 6, R. at 1219); and (4) submitting a special verdict to the
jury which wholly failed to mention Home Savings officers' and
directors' actions as being a possible cause of Home Savings'
loss.

(Special Verdict, R. at 1347-1350.)
A party to an action is entitled to have its theory

of the case fully and fairly presented to the jury through
appropriate jury instructions.
37 (Utah 1980).

Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d

An error in jury instructions requires

reversal if it is determined to have been prejudicial, based on
a review of the records as a whole.

Cambelt Int'l. Corp. v.

Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987); Purflinger v. Artiles,
727 F.2d 888, 895 (10th Cir. 1984).

Error in jury instructions

is determined "not [by] whether the charge was faultless in
every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any way
and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duties
to determine those issues."

Patty Precision Products Co. v.
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Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.
1988) .
B.

Preclusion of Jury's Consideration of Aetna's Primary
Factual Defense.
The trial court's preclusion of the bad business

judgment/mismanagement defense is found in review of the
jury instructions and special verdict form imposed by Judge
Murphy.

Over Aetna's objection, the trial court gave Jury

Instruction No. 29, which precluded the jury from considering
whether "better policies and procedures or adherence thereto
would have checked the dishonesty, if any, of Larry Glad and
prevented a loss that would have otherwise have occurred."

The

trial court refused to give Aetna's proffered Instruction
No. 42, which proposed that there may be more than one
"efficient cause of an event or loss" and that the jury could
consider as a "contributing cause . . . the failure of the
officers and directors of Home Savings to require compliance
with appropriate lending practices and procedures . . . ." The
trial court also refused to give Aetna's proffered Instruction
No. 2, which proposed that if the losses occurred because of
plaintiff's "own mismanagement, misfeasance or other negligence
and/or failure to follow safe and sound lending practices, then
you must find there was no coverage for Home under the bond."
In addition to omitting to mention the alternative
cause of loss claimed by Aetna, the trial court in Instruction
No. 26 stated that Aetna claims the plaintiff's loss "resulted
not from the dishonesty of Larry Glad, but that it directly
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resulted from a separate and independent cause"; however, "for
Aetna to prevail on this defense [it] must prove the existence
of an alternative cause [which is] separate and independent
from Larry Glad's dishonesty, if any."

(R. at 1327.)

Instead

of following up that instruction with clarification as to how
the jury could consider other causes, the trial court gave
Instruction Nos. 27, 28, 29, and 30.

(R. at 1328-1331.)

Those

instructions stated that plaintiff's failure to supervise Larry
Glad was not a defense, nor the negligent failure to discover
Glad's dishonesty, nor Home's inadequate policies and
procedures, nor the negligent failure to follow policies and
procedures that it did have, nor the negligent hiring of Larry
Glad.

Therefore, taking the instructions on this point as a

whole, the jury was forced to conclude that Home Savings'
mismanagement and bad business practices could not be
considered as a separate cause of the loss.

(See also Juror

Affidavits, R. at 2032-2053, 2055-2057, attached at Document
Addendum J.)
This issue on appeal pertains to causation.

The

trial court instructed the jury to the effect that if Larry
Glad's dishonesty was involved to any extent in causing the
loss, full bond coverage would be allowed.

On the other

hand, under the instructions as given, if bad business judgment
or mismanagement were not the exclusive, sole cause of a
bad loan (thereby precluding even the nominal tainting effect
of Larry Glad), it could not be considered to any extent in
apportioning damages.
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When it came time to draft the Special Verdict form,
Aetna proposed the following question:

"6.

Did any loss

sustained by Home Savings directly result from its
mismanagement, misconduct, negligence, and/or failure to follow
safe and sound lending practices?"

(R. at 1219.)

This, or a

similar question, would have allowed the jury to indicate such
causation and then to apportion cause between Larry Glad's
dishonesty and Home's own mismanagement and bad business
judgment.

The trial court disallowed that language.

Instead,

the jury had to answer the following special verdict question:
"2.

Did the verdict against Home Savings in the lawsuit of

Armitage, et al. v. Home Savings & Loan, in whole or in
part, directly result from dishonest or fraudulent acts, if
any, of Larry Glad?"

(R. at 1347) (emphasis added.)

Thus, the

jury was left with an instruction which excluded the
consideration of bad business judgment and mismanagement for
any purpose, but which allowed recovery under the Bond if
Glad's dishonesty was in any way involved ("in whole or in
part") in the loss sustained by Home Savings.

C.

Conclusion.
In spite of this combination of misleading

instructions and the restrictive verdict form, one of the
jurors (No. 10) still voted outright that Larry Glad's
dishonesty had not "in whole or in part" caused home Savings'
loss.

(R. at 2917.258 ) A number of other jurors were

confused by the combination of instructions and verdict form
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and said so in the affidavits submitted to the Court in
February 1988.

(R. at 2032-2053, 2055-2057, attached at

Document Addendum J.)

The primary complaint of the jury was

that the instructions and the verdict form took the case out of
their hands and left them with only one result to reach on the
thin thread of a finding that Larry Glad was "in part" involved
in the AFCO investor lending activity.
The trial court's series of instructions and verdict
forms nullified Aetna's strongest factual defense.

A number of

jurors claimed they were unfairly prevented from considering
the alternative cause—that the court had "taken the case away
from them."
clear.

(Id.)

The prejudice from instructional error is

This Court should rule in Aetna's favor on this issue

and remand for a new trial on the basis of prejudicial errors
in instructing the jury as to causation.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR BY FAILING
TO REQUIRE HOME SAVINGS TO JOIN ITS PRIOR FIDELITY
BOND INSURER, F&D OF MARYLAND, AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
A.

Aetna's Motion to Join an Indispensable Party,
On April 15, 1987, Aetna moved for dismissal of Home

Savings' Complaint for failure to join F&D as an
indispensable party.

(R. at 100-101A)

The motion was brought

to enforce Section 9 of the Bond which is entitled "Limit of
Liability Under This Bond and Prior Insurance."

Section 9

provides that coverage under Aetna's Bond shall be only excess
to claims payable on prior insurance, to the extent that the
loss was "discovered within the period permitted under such
other bond or policy for the discovery of loss thereunder . .
. ."

(Emphasis added.)
The trial court ruled against Aetna on its motion.

(See May 29, 1987, Minute Entry [R. at 143-45]; and June 12,
1987 Order [R. at 163-65].)

This is in spite of the carefully

drafted language of the F&D and the Aetna bonds, both Standard
Form 22's, which is calculated to provide a steady line of
coverage from bond to bond without either overlap or gaps.
(Don Bradshaw test., R. at 2906.25; also Tr. Ex. 118.)

On this

issue, as on previous ones, the trial court strained the limits
of both the Bond's language and the law to create coverage for
Home Savings which it had lost due to its own inexplicable
failure to pursue recovery on the F&D bond —

the bond which

was in place at the time of Larry Glad's conduct, at the time
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Home Savings had full knowledge of the nature of that conduct,
and at the time which Home Savings was booking losses on and
being sued over the AFCO investor loans which were then in
total default.

B. The Law of Mandatory Joinder.
Rule 19, U.R.Civ.P., provides that a person shall
be joined as a party if he is subject to process, if his
presence will not deprive the Court of subject matter
jurisdiction, and if "in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties."

This language affirms

the traditional purpose of joinder, which is to assure a full
and just adjudication between the existing parties.

Stone v.

Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631, 637 (1960),
cert, denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961).

See also, Kemp v.

Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984).
In Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, etc.,
83 Cal. App. 3d 543, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1978), the court
considered the dismissal of one insurance company when the
issue of coverage between prior and subsequent policies was
raised.

Both bonds in that case were fidelity bonds with

discovery clauses which limited coverage to losses sustained by
the insured at any time but discovered within the period of the
bond.

Both bonds also had provisions which dealt with prior

and subsequent coverage by other insurance policies.
The court in Continental Ins. v. Morgan held that
where the coverage question was ambiguous because of the
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"discovery" issue, it was inappropriate to dismiss either
insurance company.

Although the insured in Continental Ins.

v. Morgan was eventually absolved of the alleged loss, the
fidelity bonds in that case did require indemnification for
costs associated with defending the action on the merits.
(Coverage of Home Savings1 defense costs is also an issue in
the present case.

See discussion in Point VIII, below.)

Under

the circumstances, the court held "[w]here two insurers cover
the same risk, defense costs must also be shared between them
pro rata in proportion to the respective coverage afforded by
them to the insured."

148 Cal. Rptr. at 66.

Hence, where

there is an issue as to which of two insurance policies
provides coverage, both insuring companies are necessary
parties to a full and proper adjudication.

C.

The Facts of Two Separate Bonds.
Prior to June 21, 1982, plaintiff had $900,000 of

fidelity coverage from "F&D" on Standard Form No. 22, Bond
No. 60 33 236.

(See Exhibit Addendum, Tab 116.)

Both the

Aetna and the F&D bonds are modified by Riders SR 6041 which
contain identical language defining the extent of coverage for
loss through "dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee."
Both bonds contain language in Section 9 that
coverage shall only be excess to claims payable on prior
insurance.

In addition, F&D's bond is modified by Rider

No. 618, which limits F&D's exposure after termination of the
bond to only those insurable events "discovered before the time
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such termination . . . becomes effective."
the F&D policy expire on June 21, 1982.

Home Savings let

It did not obtain the

Aetna Bond until July 14, 1982, although coverage was made
retroactive to June 21st in order to preserve continuity of
coverage without overlap or gaps.

(Don Bradshaw Test., R. at

2906.25; Tr. Ex. 118.)
On December 9, 1982, and December 21, 1982, plaintiff
notified both F&D and Aetna of claims under their respective
bonds through identical letters sent by David B. Boyce of the
law firm Backman, Clark & Marsh and by Thomas A. Quinn of the
law firm Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.
included in Exhibit Addendum.)

(Tr. Exs. 119 and 120; copies
Both F&D and Aetna responded

that the alleged conduct did not fall under the terms of
coverage for employee dishonesty or fraud.

(Tr. Ex. 140.)

Both insurers also asserted that because of Section 9 of the
bonds that Home Savings1 claim, if valid, would be covered by
the other company.

Id.

It was these contrary positions

which required joinder of F&D as a party, as well as the fact
that by the express terms of the bonds only one or the other
but not both of the insurers could be liable for the losses.

D.

Conclusion.
Because of the trial court's erroneous ruling on

joinder, the case proceeded to trial without F&D, and with
the trial court having determined as a matter of law that the
Aetna Bond provided primary coverage because Home Savings
discovered its "loss sustained" during the period of the Aetna
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Bond.

(See Point II, above).

Aetna was thus denied even the

possibility of apportionment of damages and defense costs.
This is the incomplete resolution of issues with regard to
existing parties which Rule 19(a)(1) is designed to avoid, and
which requires joinder of the other insurer.

See, South

Kamas Irrigation Company v. Provo River Water Users'
Association, 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P.2d 851, 852 (1960).

The

Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment entered against
Aetna because the trial court's failure to require the joinder
of P&D severely prejudiced Aetna's defense at trial.

See

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989).
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POINT VII
PROPER CALCULATION OF HOME'S
LOSSES REQUIRES AN OFFSET FOR FUNDS
COLLECTED DIRECTLY THROUGH RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENTS
AND OTHER FUNDS PAID FOR HOME SAVINGS' BENEFIT.
At trial, Home Savings proved the net amount of each
of the 36 AFCO investor loans and it claimed and was awarded
the aggregate as its principal damages.

However, Home Savings

also created Trial Exhibit 83 (copy included at Tab 83 of
Exhibit Addendum), which shows that Home Savings recouped
$2 37,760.77 from those AFCO investor loans.
These funds were recovered by Home Savings through
several unique arrangements.

For instance, on four of the

loans, Home Savings put restrictive endorsements ("Pay to the
Order of Home Savings") on the back of the proceeds check prior
to closing to insure that the funds would never leave its
control.

(E. Reese test., R. at 2903.114, and 2903.136-.138.)

(See Tr. Exs. 163, 177, 172X, and 147W.)

This was done with

the knowledge and approval of Vice President, Bill Cox.
2903.114 and 2903.136-.138.)

(R. at

On other loans, the checks were

endorsed by the borrower to AFCO, and then by Grant Affleck on
behalf of AFCO back to Home Savings.

(Tr. Exs. 174X and 168U;

E. Reese test., R. at 2903.140.)
Late in December 1981, after Larry Glad had been
fired and when AFCO's payments to Home Savings were all
bouncing (E. Reese test., R. at 2803.143-.144), Bill Cox gave
specific instructions to Home Savings' loan closing officer,
Elaine Reese, to close certain loans and use the proceeds to
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cover specific problems.

(Tr. Ex. 67; a copy is included at

Tab 67 of Exhibit Addendum.)

Cox was directed to give that

instruction by Executive Vice President Fred Smolka.

(W. Cox

test., R. at 2905.129-.13 0.) These circumstances, and Cox's
note to Elaine Reese (Tr. Ex. 67) , are some of the most blatant
evidence of Home Savings' direct relationship with Grant
Affleck and its accoironodation of the unusual AFCO investor loan
arrangements.

This was all done because Home Savings had lost

control of its loan process to Grant Affleck.
R. at 2903.141-.142.)

(E. Reese test.,

Larry Glad had no involvement, control,

or input whatsoever in these arrangements.
As shown by Trial Exhibit 83 and the trial testimony
of Bill Cox (R. at 2905.97-.99), Home Savings recovered
$237,760.77 from proceeds of the AFCO investor loans and
disposed of those funds to its own benefit and at its sole
discretion.

Importantly, Larry Glad had nothing whatsoever to

do with conceiving or executing this recoupment project.

This

insidious aspect of the AFCO investor loans is further evidence
(see Point V, above) of Home Savings' management's direct
involvement in and manipulation of the entire investment
scheme.
The funds were first used to pay off principal and
interest on the $100,000 loan that Home Savings had made to
AFCO on November 10, 1981. According to all the trial
evidence, that was a bad loan because of President Howard
Bradshaw's and Executive Vice President Fred Smolka's
carelessness in negotiating and approving the loan on behalf of
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Home Savings.

(See discussion on Bad Business Judgment and

Mismanagement at Point V, above.)
Home Savings next used the funds to rescind the
Snitkoff and Sadler loans, which were not directly involved in
the trial of this case.
investors.

Snitkoff and Sadler were AFCO

The proceeds of their loans had been given to Grant

Affleck through the special arrangements between Affleck and
Home Savings1 management, but the borrowers rescinded before
Home Savings had recorded the trust deeds.

(W. Cox test., R.

at 2905.97-.98; E. Reese test.; R. at 2903.146-.147.)

Thus, a

$65,823.33 loss was averted by Home Savings1 recoupment of loan
funds from other, less fortunate AFCO investors who later
became parties in the Armitage lawsuit.
Exhibit 83 also shows that Home Savings made three
payments directly to AFCO from the investor funds that it had
recouped.

This $38,235.86 represents a gratuitous transfer

from Home Savings of funds which it had in its possession.
Finally, although in its calculation of damages the
trial court deducted the 3 percent origination fee paid to Home
Savings by the AFCO investors on the loans which were rescinded
in the Armitage judgment, it failed to deduct the 2.5 percent
commitment fee paid to Home Savings by AFCO for those loans.
(Cf., Tr. Ex. 83 with Tr. Exs. 11 and 8.)

So proper

calculation of Home Savings1 true loss would require reduction
of the $31,875.00 commitment fee as well.
The funds which Home Savings recouped from the
disbursement of the AFCO investor loans represents losses which
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Home Savings did not sustain.

If Home Savings had

properly used those funds to reduce the principal on the 3 6
AFCO investor loans which were not being paid by Grant Affleck
as agreed (see, e.g., Tr. Ex. 81) and which were all in
default, there would have been a direct reduction in the losses
Home Savings experienced in the Armitage judgment.
Accordingly, the trial court should have reduced the losses on
the principal of the AFCO investor loans by $237,760.77 in
calculating its judgment.
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POINT VIII
HOME SAVINGS IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION
FOR THE LEGAL FEES AWARDED TO THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS
NOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF COURT COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING
THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION
A.

The Legal Fees Awarded to the Armitage Plaintiffs,
In order for the attorney's fees of a third-party

(i.e., the Armitage plaintiffs) to be recoverable by an
insured in an action to enforce a fidelity bond, the
third-party's causes of action must fall within the terms of
the insured's policy coverage.

Continental Bank & Trust Co.

v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.# 550 P.2d 222, 223 (Utah
1976); 15A Couch on Insurance 2d § 57:47 at 136-38 (1983).
The Federal District Court in the Armitage case expressly
awarded the Armitage plaintiffs their attorney's fees on the
basis of "the federal and state truth in lending statutes and
the Utah securities statute . . . ."

(See Order Awarding

Attorney's Fees, p. 2, R. at 2243-2244.)

This Order was made

in accordance with the rule that attorney's fees are awardable
only if provided by statute or a contract, since attorney's
fees were not recoverable at common law.

Golden Key Realty,

Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); C.G. Horman Co. v.
Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 112, 499 P.2d 124 (1972).
Plaintiff cannot recover the amount it paid for the
Armitage plaintiffs' legal fees ($190,647.31), because those
fees derive from a claim which is expressly excluded from bond
coverage by the securities trading rider of the Bond.
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(See

Point IV, above)•

The Bond excludes coverage for losses which

are "directly or indirectly" connected with the trading of
securities.

Id.

In the case of Hepler v. Fireman's Fund

Ins. Co., 239 S.2d 669 (La. Ct. App. 1970), the court
interpreted the trading exclusion rider in a bond identical in
all material respects to the Aetna Bond.

The court held that

the insured could not recover expenses and attorney fees it
incurred in defense of an action based on an employee's
wrongful trading activities.

Id. at 677.

Therefore, the

award against Home Sctvings of the Armitage plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees under the Utah securities law, U.C.A.
§ 61-1-22(1)(b), cannot be recovered under the Bond.
The other basis for awarding the Armitage
plaintiffs' legal fees was Home Savings' violation of the
statutory truth-in-lending laws.

(R. at 2243-2244.)

See 15

U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3); and U.C.A. § 70B-5-203(1)(c). But under
Insuring Agreement A, and Rider SR 6041, Aetna's bond covers
only losses due to "dishonest or fraudulent acts," i.e., the
type of wrong which is malum in se.
Under the common law, a crime consisted of
two elements, an evil intention and an
unlawful act (malum in se). Malum
in s^e crimes usually fall into two
classifications: (1) those such as theft
and fraud, which require a specific intent
to commit, and (2) offenses such as rape,
which require no specific intent to commit
the offense.
State v. Jones, 242 Kan. 385, 748 P.2d 839, 844 (1988).
In contrast, truth-in-lending laws cover conduct
which is malum prohibitum, that is wrong because it is
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prohibited, not because it is inherently immoral or improper.
State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571, 574 (1965)
("[failure to file a tax return] is an offense malum
prohibitum, a wrong because it is made so by statute, and
thus of a character not generally considered to be inherently
evil, as in the case of offenses which are malum in se.")
The technical and statutory aspect of
truth-in-lending violations is reflected in Jury Instruction
No. 13.01 which was given in the Armitage case.
Addendum K.)

(Document

As a statutory or malum prohibitum type of

infraction, any liability imposed on plaintiff as a result of
its violations of truth-in-lending law is not the type of loss
contemplated by the parties in entering into the fidelity bond,
and it is therefore not covered.
Furthermore, the evidence presented in this case
demonstrates that the truth-in-lending violation was caused by
Home Savings' loan officer, Elaine Reese.

It was she who was

in charge of preparing closing documents and arranging for
closings.

(E. Reese test.; R. at 2903.121.)

It was she who

back-dated the loan documents in order to expedite AFCO's
receipt of its investors1 funds.
2903.150.)

(E. Reese test.; R. at

Thus, any violation of the truth-in-lending statute

was not a loss caused by the conduct of Larry Glad.
Prior to the trial, Home Savings had made general
allegations of employee dishonesty which were not restricted to
Larry Glad.

In the Pretrial Order, Home Savings restricted

itself to losses covered only by Larry Glad.
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(R. at 721.)

In

addition, during the conferences with the Court to draft Jury
Instructions and prepare Special Verdict forms and Special
Interrogatories, plaintiff's counsel limited its claims
expressly to the conduct of Larry Glad and rejected any
inclusion of Elaine Reese as a source of dishonest or
fraudulent conduct which caused its loss.

Therefore, the fees

awarded against plaintiff under the truth-in-lending laws do
not constitute a covered loss.

The judgment should be reduced

by $190,647.31.
B.

Home Sayings' Costs and Fees in Defending the Armitage
Litigation.
Home Savings and Aetna have stipulated that

$437,500.00 was Home Savings' reasonable cost of defending
the Armitage lawsuit and initiating an appeal from the
adverse judgment.
3850-3853.)

(See Stipulation of November 2, 1988; R. at

However, defendant Aetna reserved the issue of

whether Home Savings is entitled to those fees at all in
defending a liability which falls outside the terms and period
of the Aetna Bond.

Id.

General Agreement C of the Bond states that the
insured is indemnified for "court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred . . . on account of any loss, claim or
damage which, if established against the Insured, would
constitute a valid and collectible loss sustained by the
Insured under the terms of this bond."

Because of the trading

exclusion (Rider SR 6030a; see Point IV, above) and the fact
that the loss was discovered long before the Bond went into
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effect (Preamble, and Rider 6091; see Point II, above), the
Armitage defense could not "constitute a valid and
collectible loss sustained by the Insured under this bond."
Therefore, the attorneys' fees and costs of defense should not
be allowed.
An indemnitee under a bond is bound by the
determinations of a former adverse judgment, as it reflects on
the issue of coverage, particularly where the indemnitee puts
the former judgment into evidence in an action against its
indemnitor.
(1982).

11 Couch on Insurance 2d § 44:9 pp. 196-97

Home Savings put the Armitage judgment into evidence

both as Exhibit "B" to its Amended Complaint, and as Trial
Exhibit 343.
claims.

That judgment was for multiple securities

The only one of seven causes of action in Armitage

falling within the terms of the Bond's coverage was common law
fraud.

Accordingly, Home Savings is entitled to recover only

those court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
defending against that claim.

See, i.e., Waite v. Aetna

Casualty and Sur. Co., 77 Wash. 2d 850, 467 P.2d 847 (1970)
(damages and attorney's fees apportioned between claims covered
and not covered by insurance policy).
In Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1981) the court dealt
with an apportionment problem similar to the one faced in the
present case.

That case involved a bank's failure, in part,

because a number of the bank's borrowers were unable to repay
their loans.

Many of the bad loans had been granted only after
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the bank's president and chairman of the board personally
received "loan fees" or other benefits in exchange for
approving the loans.

Id. at 935.

The bank's depositors lost

money and sought recourse through recovery on the bank's
fidelity bond.

The Ninth Circuit held that "only that

proportion of loss arising from the nonpayment of dishonest
loans should be attributed to dishonesty and thus [be]
recoverable under the [bank's fidelity] bond."

Id.

at 936.

In so holding, that court adopted the district court's "logical
and equitable apportionment between dishonesty and other
factors" which caused the bank to fail.

See Fidelity

Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp., 440
F.Supp. 862, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd 647 F.2d 933.
Similarly, in Biundo v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 662 F.2d
1297 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held that recovery of
attorney's fees may not exceed the amount attributable to the
attorney's efforts to obtain payment due under an insurance
contract, and that an insured may not collect attorney's fees
incurred in pursuit of a claim for damages not covered by the
policy.
Under this state of the law,and in light of the
language of Aetna's Bond, plaintiff's $437,500.00 of defense
costs should be denied.

If allowed at all, they should only be

in an amount equivalent to the expense of defending the common
law fraud claim in the Armitage case.

At most, Home Savings

should recover only one seventh ($62,500.00) of its defense
costs under General Agreement C of the Bond.
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CONCLUSION
Home Savings was not entitled to coverage under the
Aetna Bond for sound and equitable reasons, which are
reinforced by applicable case law.

The timing of Home Savings1

purchase of the Aetna Bond on July 14, 1982, in relation to the
occurrence of events from November 1981 to January 1982, giving
rise to Home Savings1 ultimate loss, together with Home
Savings1 "discovery" of those facts during a period through
June 4, 1982, is the primary thrust of Aetna's defenses.

Aetna

made every reasonable effort to present those defenses to the
jury, but the trial court refused to allow the jury to decide
most of those issues.

The jury's findings in Aetna's favor on

the Bond application process and on Home Savings' learning of
Larry Glad's dishonesty seven months before Home Savings'
purchase of the Aetna Bond, were disregarded by the trial court
in entering its judgment.
Given the facts of this case, the Bond should be
rescinded because Home Savings made misrepresentations and
nondisclosures of material facts to Aetna in the Bond
application process.

If the Bond is given effect, then it was

void ab initio as to Larry Glad because of Home Savings'
prior knowledge of Larry Glad's dishonesty, and it was void
ab initio as to losses on the AFCO investor loans because
Home Savings' "discovery" of loss on those loans occurred prior
to the Bond period.

These results are equitable in particular

because Home Savings had an identical Bond in place through
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Fidelity & Deposit up through the time that the Aetna Bond took
effect.
The trial court further erred by failing to present
to the jury Aetna's primary factual defense of mismanagement
and bad business judgment as an alternative cause for Home
Savings' loss.

In addition, the Bond's trading exclusion Rider

excludes coverage for losses from trading insecurities because
Aetna did not contemplate and Home Savings did not purchase
coverage for this type of special risk.

The award of attorney

fees as an element of damages should be adjusted accordingly.
Finally, and in the alternative, any award of damages to Home
Savings should be reduced to the extent of Home Savings'
benefit from proceeds it received directly from the AFCO
investor loans.
Aetna does not challenge the jury's very limited
factual finding in Home Savings' favor on the Special Verdict.
However, Aetna does challenge the trial court's disregarding of
the jury's findings in Aetna's favor in the Special
Interrogatories.

Aetna also challenges the trial court's

ruling on many important issues as a matter of law and its
refusal to present those potentially dispositive issues to the
jury.

Ultimately, the jury intended Aetna to prevail, and it

attempted to find accordingly; but it believed that after four
and one-half weeks of trial, the case had been taken away from
it by the trial court.

That perception is accurate.

Aetna requests the following relief:

(1) if this

Court finds in Aetna's favor on Points I, II or III, this Court
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should direct entry of judgment in Aetna's favor, no cause of
action; (2) if this Court finds in Aetna's favor on Points IV,
V, or VI, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings and retrial; and (3) if the Court finds in
Aetna's favor on Points VII or VIII, the trial court should be
directed to reduce the amount of judgment.
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